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The problem of information ﬂow in multithreaded programs remains an important open
challenge. Existing approaches to specifying and enforcing information-ﬂow security often
suffer from over-restrictiveness, relying on nonstandard semantics, lack of compositional-
ity, inability to handle dynamic threads, inability to handle synchronization, scheduler
dependence, and efﬁciency overhead for the code that results from security-enforcing
transformations. This paper suggests a remedy for some of these shortcomings by devel-
oping a novel treatment of the interaction between threads and the scheduler. As a result,
we present a permissive noninterference-like security speciﬁcation and a compositional
security type system that provably enforces this speciﬁcation. The type system guaran-
tees security for a wide class of schedulers and provides a ﬂexible and efﬁciency-friendly
treatment of dynamic threads.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The problem of information ﬂow in multithreaded programs remains an important open challenge [34]. While informa-
tion ﬂow in sequential programs is relatively well understood, information-ﬂow security speciﬁcations and enforcement
mechanisms for sequential programs do not generalize naturally to multithreaded programs [38]. In this light, it is hardly
surprising that Jif [23] and Flow Caml [32], the mainstream compilers that enforce secure information ﬂow, lack support for
multithreading.
Nevertheless, the need for information ﬂow control in multithreaded programs is pressing because concurrency and
multithreading are ubiquitous in modern programming languages. Furthermore, multithreading is essential in security-
critical systems because threads provide an effective mechanism for realizing the separation-of-duties principle [40].
There is a series of properties that are desired of an approach to information ﬂow for multithreaded programs:
– Permissiveness: The presence of multithreading enables new attacks which are not possible for sequential programs.
The challenge is to reject these attacks without compromising the permissiveness of the model. In other words,
information ﬂow models should accept as many intuitively secure and useful programs as possible.
– Scheduler-independence: The security of a given program should not critically depend on a particular scheduler [37].
Scheduler-dependent security models suffer from the weakness that security guarantees may be destroyed by a slight
change in the scheduler policy. Therefore, we aim at a security condition that is robust with respect to a wide class of
schedulers.
– Realistic semantics: Following the philosophy of extensional security [22], we argue for security deﬁned in terms of
standard semantics, as opposed to security-instrumented semantics. If there are some nonstandard primitives that
accommodate security, they should be clearly and securely implementable.
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– Language expressiveness: A key to a practical security model is an expressive underlying language. In particular, the
language should be able to treat dynamic thread creation, as well as provide possibilities for synchronization.
– Practical enforcement: Another practical key is a tractable security enforcement mechanism. Particularly attractive is
compile-time automatic compositional analysis. Such an analysis should nevertheless be permissive, striving to trade
as little expressiveness and efﬁciency for security as possible.
This paper develops an approach that is compatible with each of these properties by a novel treatment of the interaction
between threads and the scheduler. We enrich the language with primitives for raising and lowering the security levels
of threads. Threads with different security levels are treated differently by the scheduler, ensuring that the interleaving
of publicly-observable events may not depend on sensitive data. As a result, we present a permissive noninterference-like
security speciﬁcation and a compositional security type system that provably enforces this speciﬁcation. The type system
guarantees security for a wide class of schedulers and provides a ﬂexible and efﬁciency-friendly treatment of dynamic
threads.
The main novelty of this paper, compared to a previous workshop version [27], is the inclusion of synchronization
primitives into the underlying language.
In the rest of the paper we present background and related work (Section 2), the underlying language (Section 3), the
security speciﬁcation (Section 4), and the type-based analysis (Section 5).We discuss an extension to cooperative schedulers
(Section 6), an example (Section 7), implementation issues (Section 8), and present an extension of the framework with
synchronization primitives (Section 9), before we conclude the paper (Section 10).
2. Motivation and background
This section motivates and exempliﬁes some key issues with tracking information ﬂow in multithreaded programs and
presents an overview of existing work on addressing these issues.
2.1. Leaks via scheduler
Assume a partition of variables into high (secret) and low (public). Suppose h and l are a high and a low variable,
respectively. Intuitively, information ﬂow in a program is secure (or satisﬁes noninterference [7,13,42]) if public outcomes of
the program do not depend on high inputs. Typical leaks in sequential programs arise from explicit ﬂows (as in assignment
l := h) and implicit [8] ﬂows via control ﬂow (as in conditional if h > 0 then l := 1 else l := 0).
The ability of sequential threads to share memory opens up new information channels. Consider the following thread
commands:
c1 : h := 0; l := h c2 : h := secret
where secret is a high variable. Thread c1 is secure because the ﬁnal value of l is always 0. Thread c2 is secure because h
and secret are at the same security level. Nevertheless, the parallel composition c1 ‖ c2 of the two threads is not necessarily
secure. The schedulermight schedule c2 after assignment h := 0 and before l := h is executed in c1. As a result, secret is copied
into l.
Consider another pair of thread commands:
d1 : ( if h > 0 then sleep(100) else skip); l := 1 d2 : sleep(50); l := 0
These threads are clearly secure in isolation because 1 is always the outcome for l in d1, and 0 is always the outcome for l
in d2. However, when d1 and d2 are executed in parallel, the security of the threadpool is no longer guaranteed. In fact, the
program will leak whether the initial value of hwas positive into l under many reasonable schedulers.
We observe that program c1 ‖ c2 can be straightforwardly secured by synchronization. Assuming the underlying language
features locks, we can rewrite the program as
c1 :lock; h := 0; l := h; unlock c2 : lock; h := secret; unlock
The lock primitives ensure that the undesired interleaving of c1 and c2 is prevented. Note that this solution prevents a
race condition [31] in the sense that it is now impossible for the two threads (where one of them attempts writing) to
simultaneously access variable h.
Unfortunately, synchronization primitives, which are typically used for race-condition prevention (e.g. [6]), offer no
general solution. The source of the leak in program d1 ‖ d2 is internal timing [41]. The essence of the problem is that the
timing behavior of a threadmay affect—via the scheduler—the interleaving of assignments. Aswewill see later in this section,
securing interleavings from within the program (such as with synchronization primitives) is a highly delicate matter.
What is the key reason for these ﬂows? Observe that in both cases, it is the interleaving of the threads that introduces
leaks. Hence, it is the scheduler and its interaction with the threads that needs to be secured in order to prevent undesired
information disclosure. In this paper,we suggest a treatment of schedulers that allows the programmer to ensure fromwithin
the program that undesired interleavings are prevented.
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In the rest of this section, we review existing approaches to information ﬂow inmultithreaded programs that are directly
related to the paper. We refer to an overview of language-based information security [34] for other, less related, work.
2.2. Possibilistic security
Smith and Volpano [38] explore possibilistic noninterference for a language with static threads and a purely nondetermin-
istic scheduler. Possibilistic noninterference states that possible low outputs of a program may not vary as high inputs are
varied. Program d1 ‖ d2 from above is considered secure because possible ﬁnal values of l are always 0 and 1, independently
of the initial value of h. Because the choice of a scheduler affects the security of the program, this demonstrates that this
deﬁnition is not scheduler-independent. Generally, possibilistic noninterference is subject to the well known phenomenon
that conﬁdentiality is not preserved by reﬁnement [21]. Work by Honda et al. [15,17] and Pottier [24] is focused on type-
based techniques for tracking possibilistic information ﬂow in variants of the π calculus. Forms of noninterference under
nondeterministic schedulers have been explored in the context of CCS (see [12] for an overview) and CSP (see [29] for an
overview).
2.3. Scheduler-speciﬁc security
Volpano and Smith [41] have investigated probabilistic noninterference for a language with static threads. Probabilities in
their multithreaded system come from the scheduler, which is assumed to select threads uniformly, i.e., each thread can be
scheduled with the same probability. Volpano and Smith introduce a special primitive in order to help protecting against
internal timing leaks. This primitive is called protect, and it can be applied to any command that contains no loops. A
protected command protect(c) is executed atomically, by deﬁnition of its semantics. Such a primitive can be used to secure
program d1 ‖ d2 as
d1 : protect( if h > 0 then sleep(100) else skip); d2 : sleep(50); l := 0
l := 1
The timing difference is not visible to the scheduler because of the atomic semantics of protect. The protect primitive
is, however, nonstandard. It is not obvious how such a primitive can be implemented (unless the scheduler is cooper-
ative [28,39]). A synchronization-based implementation would face some nontrivial challenges. In the case of program
d1 ‖ d2, a possible implementation of protect could attempt locking all other threads while execution is inside of the if
statement:
d1 :lock; ( if h > 0 then sleep(100) else skip);
unlock; lock; l := 1; unlock
d2 : lock; sleep(50); unlock; lock; l := 0; unlock
Although this implementation prevents race conditions related to simultaneous access of variable l, unfortunately, such an
implementation is insecure. The somewhat subtle reason is that when the execution is inside of the if statement, the other
threads do not become instantly locked. Thread d2 can still be scheduled, which could result in blocking and updating the
wait list for the lock with d2.
For simplicity, assume that sleep(n) is an abbreviation for n consecutive skip commands. Consider a scheduler that picks
thread d1 ﬁrst and then proceeds to run a thread for 70 steps before giving the control to the other thread. If h > 0 then d1
will run for 70 steps and, while being in the middle of sleep(100), the control will be given to thread d2. Thread d2 will try
to acquire the lock but will block, which will result in d2 being placed as the ﬁrst thread in the wait list for the lock. The
scheduler will then schedule d1 again, and d1 will release the lock with unlock and try to grab the lock with lock. However,
it will fail because d2 is the ﬁrst in the wait list. As a result, d1 will be put behind d2 in the wait list. Further, d2 will be
scheduled to set l to 0, release the lock, and ﬁnish. Finally, d1 is able to grab the lock and execute l := 1, release the lock, and
ﬁnish. The ﬁnal value of l is 1. If, on the other hand, h ≤ 0 then, clearly, d1 will ﬁnish within 70 steps, and the control will
be then given to d2, which will grab the lock, execute l := 0, release the lock, and ﬁnish. The ﬁnal value of l in this case is
0, which demonstrates that the program is insecure. Generally, under many schedulers, chances for l := 0 in d2 to execute
before l := 1 in d1 are higher if the initial value of h is positive. Thus, the above implementation fails to remove the internal
timing leak.
This example illustrates the need for a tighter interactionwith the scheduler. The scheduler needs to be able to suspended
certain threads instantly. This ﬂexibility motivates the introduction of the hide and unhide constructs in this paper.
Returning to probabilistic scheduler-speciﬁc noninterference, Smith has continued this line of work [35] to emphasize
practical enforcement. In contrast to previous work, the security type system accepts while loops with high guards when no
assignments to low variables follow such loops. Independently, Boudol and Castellani [3,4] provide a type system of similar
power and show possibilistic noninterference for typable programs. This system does not rely on protect-like primitives but
winds up rejecting assignments to low variables that follow conditionals with high guards.
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The approaches above do not handle dynamic threads. Smith [36] has suggested that the language can be extended with
dynamic thread creation. The extension is discussed informally, with no deﬁnition for the semantics of fork, the thread
creation construct. A compositional typing rule for fork is given, which allows spawning threads under conditionals with
high guards. However, the uniform scheduler assumption is critical for such a treatment (as it is also for the treatment of
while loops). Consider the following example:
e1 : l := 0 e2 : l := 1 e3 : if h > 0 then fork(skip, skip) else skip
This program is considered secure according to [36]. Suppose the scheduler happens to ﬁrst execute e3 and then schedule
the ﬁrst thread (e1) if the threadpool has more than three threads and the second thread (e2) otherwise. This results in an
information leak from h to l because the size of the threadpool depends on h. Note that the above program is insecure for
many other schedulers. A minor deviation from the strictly uniform probabilistic choice of threads may result in leaking
information.
A possible alternative aimed at scheduler-independence is to force threads (created in branches of ifs with high guards)
along with their children to be protected, i.e., to disable all other threads until all these threads have terminated (this can be
implementedby, for example, threadpriorities). Clearly, thiswould take ahighefﬁciency tall on theencouragedprogramming
practice of placing dedicated potentially time-consuming computation in separate threads. For example, creating a new
thread for establishing a network connection is a much recommended pattern [19,20].
Theabovediscussion is anothermotivation fora tighter interactionbetween threadsand thescheduler.Aﬂexible scheduler
would accommodate thread creation in a sensitive context by scheduling such threads independently from threads with
attacker-observable assignments. This motivates the introduction of the hfork construct in this paper.
2.4. Scheduler-independent security
Sabelfeld and Sands [37] introduce a scheduler-independent security condition (with respect to possibly probabilistic
schedulers) and suggest a type-based analysis that enforces this condition. The condition is, however, concernedwith external
timing leaks,which implies that the attacker is powerful enough to observe the actual execution time. External timingmodels
rely on the underlying operating system and hardware to preserve the timing properties of a given program. Furthermore,
the known padding techniques (e.g. [1,37,18]) might arbitrarily change the efﬁciency of the resulting code.
In the presentwork,we assume aweaker attacker and aim for amore permissive security condition and analysis. Similarly
tomuch relatedwork (e.g. [41,36,43,16,28,25,5]) our attackermodel does not permit observations of the execution time. The
attacker may observe public outcomes of a program however, which is sufﬁcient to launch attacks via internal timing. These
attacks are dangerous because they can be magniﬁed to leak all secrets in a single run (see, e.g. [25]).
2.5. Security via low determinism
InspiredbyRoscoe’s low-viewdeterminism [26] for security inaCSPsetting, ZdancewicandMyers [43]developanapproach
to information ﬂow in concurrent systems. According to this approach, a program is secure if its publicly-observably results
are deterministic and unchanged regardless of secret inputs. This avoids reﬁnement attacks from the outset. However, low-
view determinism security rejects intuitively secure programs (such as l := 0 ‖ l := 1), introducing the risk of rejecting useful
programs. Analysis enforcing low-viewdeterminism are inherently noncompositional because the parallel compositionwith
a thread assigning to low variables is not generally secure.
Recently, Huisman et al. [16] have suggested a temporal logic-based characterization of low-view determinism security.
This characterization enables high-precision security enforcement by known model-checking techniques.
2.6. Security in the presence of synchronization
Andrews and Reitman [2] propose a logic for reasoning about information ﬂow in a language with semaphores. However,
the logic comes with no soundness arguments or decision algorithms.
External timing-sensitive security has been extended to languages with semaphores primitives by Sabelfeld [30] and
messagepassingbySabelfeld andMantel [33]. Althoughour focus is internal timing, the semanticpresentationof semaphores
from the former work serves as a useful starting point for this paper.
Recently, Russo et al. [25] have proposed a transformation that closes internal timing leaks by spawning sensitive com-
putation in dedicated threads. Semaphores play a crucial role for the synchronization of these threads. However, contrary to
this work, the source language for the transformation lacks semaphores.
3. Language
In order to illustrate our approach, we deﬁne a simple multithreaded language with dynamic thread creation. The syntax
of language commands is displayed in Fig. 1. Besides the standard imperative primitives, the language features hiding (hide
and unhide primitives) and dynamic thread creation (fork and hfork primitives).
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Fig. 1. Command syntax.
3.1. Semantics for commands
Acommand c andamemorym together forma commandconﬁguration 〈|c,m|〉. Thesemanticsof conﬁgurationsarepresented
in Fig. 2. A small semantic step has the form 〈|c,m|〉 α⇀ 〈|c′,m′|〉 that updates the command and memory in the presence of a
possible event α. Events range over the set
{
• , •, ◦d, •d
}
, where d is a set of threads. The sequential composition rule
propagates events to the top level. We describe the meaning of the events in conjunction with the rules that involve the
events.
Two kinds of threads are supported by the semantics, low and high threads, partitioning the threadpool into low and high
parts. The intention is to hide—via the scheduler—the (timing of the) execution of the high threads from the low threads.
The hiding command hidemoves the current thread from the low to the high part of the threadpool. This is expressed in
the semantics by event • that communicates to the scheduler to treat the thread as high (whether or not the thread was
already high). The unhiding command unhide has the dual effect: it communicates to the scheduler by event • that the
thread should be treated as low. To intuitively illustrate how to utilize hide and unhide, we modify the motivating example
given in Section 2.1, where we wrap the branching command around hide and unhide commands as follows:
d1 : hide; ( if h > 0 then sleep(100) else skip); unhide; l := 1
d2 : sleep(50); l := 0
Initially, both threads, d1 and d2 are treated as low by the scheduler. After executing hide, d1 is temporarily considered
as a high thread and d2 is not scheduled for executing until running the command unhide. As a consequence, the timing
differences introduced by the branching instruction in d1 are not visible to d2 and internal-timing leaks are thus avoided.
Although hide and unhide commands are nonstandard, we will show that, unlike protect, they can be straightforwardly
implemented.
Wedeﬁne independent commands hide and unhide instead of forcing them towrap code blocks syntactically (cf.protect).
We expect this choice to be useful when adding exceptions to the language. For example, consider the following program
try { if l1 then l2 := 1; hide; c1 else l2 := 0; hide; c2} catch {unhide; c3}
where command try determines code blocks that might throw an exception and command catch states exception handlers.
Variables l1, l2, and l3 are public. Commands c1 and c2 contain branches whose guards involve secrets. Command c3 is part
of the exception handler. In this program, the unhide command in the exception handler refers to several hide primitives
under the try statement.
Fig. 2. Semantics for commands.
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Commands fork(c, d) and hfork(c, d) dynamically spawn a collection d of threads (commands) d = d1 · · ·dn while the
current thread runs command c. The difference between the two primitives is in the generated event. Command fork signals
about the creation of low threads with event ◦d (where ◦ is read “low”) while hfork indicates that new threads should be
treated as high by event •d (where • is read “high”).
3.2. Semantics for schedulers
Fig. 3 depicts the semantic rules that describe the behavior of the scheduler. A scheduler is a program σ (written in
a language, not necessarily related to one from Fig. 1) that, together with a memory ν, forms a scheduler conﬁguration
〈|σ , ν|〉. We assume that the scheduler memory is disjoint from the program memory. The scheduler memory contains
variable q that regulates for how many steps a thread can be scheduled. Live (i.e., ready to execute) threads are tracked
by variable t that consists of low and high parts. The low part is named by t◦, while the high part is composed of two
subpools named t• and te. Threads in t• are always high, but threads in te were low in the past, are high at present, and
might eventually be low in the future. Threads are moved back and forth from t◦ to te by executing the hiding and unhiding
commands. Variable r represents the running thread. Variable s regulates whether low threads may be scheduled. When s is
◦, both low and high threads may be scheduled. However, when s is •, only high threads may be scheduled, preventing low
threads from observing internal timing information about high threads. In addition, the scheduler might have some internal
variables.
Whenever a scheduler-operation rule handles an event, it either corresponds to processing information from the top level
(such as threads creation and termination) or to communicating information to the top level (such as thread selection). The
rules allow to derive steps of the form 〈|σ , ν|〉 α⇁ 〈|σ ′, ν′|〉. By convention, we refer to the variables in ν as q, t, r and s and variables
in ν′ asq′, t′, r′ and s′.When these variables arenot explicitlymentioned,weadopt the convention that they remainunchanged
after the transition. We assume that besides event-driven transitions, the scheduler might perform internal operations that
are not visible at the top level (and may not change the variables above). We abstract away from these transitions, assuming
that their event labels are empty. Although the transition system in Fig. 3 is nondeterministic, we only consider deterministic
instances of schedulers for simplicity. We expect a natural generalization of our results to probabilistic schedulers.
The rules can be viewed as a set of basic assumptions that we expect the scheduler to satisfy. We abstract away from the
actual scheduler implementation—it can be arbitrary, as long as it satisﬁes these basic assumptions and runs inﬁnitely long.
We discuss an example of a scheduler that conforms to these assumptions in Section 4.
The rule for event αrd ensures that the scheduler updates the appropriate part of the threadpool (low or high, depending
on α) with newly created threads. OperationN(d) returns thread identiﬁers for d and generates fresh oneswhen new threads
are spawn by fork or hfork. The rule for event r keeps track of a nonterminal step of thread r; as an effect, counter q is
decremented. A terminal step of thread r results in a r × event, which requires the scheduler to remove thread r from the
threadpool. Events ↑◦ r′ and ↑• r′ are driven by the scheduler’s selection of thread r′. Note the difference in selecting low and
high threads. A low thread can only be selected if the value of s is ◦, as discussed above.
Events r • and • r are triggered by the hide and unhide commands, respectively. The scheduler handles event r • by
moving the current thread from the low to the high part of the threadpool and setting s′ to •. Upon event • r, the scheduler
moves the thread back to the low part of the threadpool, setting s′ to ◦.
Events r • × and • r are triggered by hide and unhide, respectively, when they are the last commands to be executed
by a thread.
3.3. Semantics for threadpools
The interaction between threads and the scheduler takes place at the top level, the level of threadpool conﬁgurations. These
conﬁgurations have the form 〈|c,m, σ , ν|〉 α→ 〈| c′,m′, σ ′, ν′|〉, where α ranges over the same set of events as in the semantics for
schedulers.
The semantics for threadpool conﬁgurations is displayed in Fig. 4. The dynamic thread creation rule is triggeredwhen the
running thread cr generates a thread creation event αd, where α is either • or ◦. This event is synchronized with scheduler
event αrd that requests the scheduler to handle the new threads depending on whether α is high or low.
If cr does not spawn new threads or terminate, then its command rule is synchronized with scheduler event r . If cr
terminates in a transition without labels, then scheduler event r × is required for synchronization in order to update the
threadpool information in the scheduler memory. If cr terminates with • (resp., • ) then synchronization with r • ×
(resp., • r×) is required to record both termination and hiding (resp., unhiding).
Scheduler event ↑α r′ triggers a selection of a new thread r′ without affecting the commands in the threadpool or their
memory. Finally, entering and exiting the high part of the threadpool is performed by synchronizing the current thread and
the scheduler on events r • and • r.
Let →* stand for the transitive and reﬂexive closure of → (which is obtained from α→ by ignoring events). If for some
threadpool conﬁguration cfg we have cfg →* cfg′, where the threadpool of cfg′ is empty, then cfg terminates in cfg′, denoted
by cfg ⇓ cfg′. Recall that schedulers always run inﬁnitely; however, according to the above deﬁnition, the entire program
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Fig. 3. Semantics for schedulers.
terminates if there are no threads to schedule. We assume that m(cfg) extracts the program memory from threadpool
conﬁguration cfg.
3.4. On multi-level extensions
Although the semantics accommodates two security levels for threads, extensions to more levels do not pose signiﬁcant
challenges. Assume a security latticeL, where security levels are ordered by a partial order , with the intention to only
allow leaks from data at level 1 to data at level 2 when 1  2. The low-and-high policy discussed above forms a two-level
lattice with elements low and high so that low  high but high  low.
In the presence of a general security lattice, the threadpool is partitioned into as many parts as the number of secu-
rity levels. Commands hide, unhide, and fork are parameterized over security level . Initially, all threads are in the
⊥-threadpool. Whenever a thread executes a hide command, it enters -threadpool. The semantics needs to ensure that
no threads from ′-threadpools, for all ′ such that   ′ may execute until the hidden thread reaches unhide. Naturally,
command fork creates threads in -threadpool.
To illustrate the use of commands hide, unhide, and fork, we present the thread d in Fig. 5. We assume three security
levels in our lattice: low, medium, and high, where low  medium  high. Commands clow , cmedium, and chigh describe low,
medium, and high threads, respectively. Variables l, k, and h (and their prime versions) are associated with security levels
low,medium, and high, respectively. The program starts by spawning three threads at different security levels. Before the ﬁrst
hide, the low-threadpool is composed by the threads d and clow , while threads cmedium and chigh are placed in the medium
and high-threadpools, respectively. At this point, any of the threads can be scheduled. Once executed hidemedium, thread clow
is not scheduled for execution until reaching the command unhidemedium. After executing the ﬁrst branching instruction,
hidehigh is executing. Then, thread cmedium is not able to run and only d and chigh can be executed at that point of the program.
After executing unhidehigh, thread cmedium can be scheduled to run. Finally, clow can be scheduled to run after executing
unhidemedium.
We will discuss how general multi-level security can be deﬁned and enforced in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.
4. Security speciﬁcation
We specify security for programs via noninterference. The attacker’s view of program memory is deﬁned by a low-
equivalence relation=L such thatm1 =L m2 if theprojectionsof thememories onto the lowvariables are the samem1|L = m2|L .
As formalized inDeﬁnition 4 below, a program is secure under some scheduler if for any two initial low-equivalentmemories,
whenever the two runs of the program terminate, then the resulting memories are also low-equivalent.
We generalize this statement to a class of schedulers, requiring schedulers to comply to the basic assumptions from
Section 3 and also requiring that they themselves are not leaky, i.e., that schedulers satisfy a form of noninterference.
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Fig. 4. Semantics for threadpools.
Fig. 5. Example of multi-level commands hide , unhide , and fork .
Scheduler-related events have different distinguishability levels. Events ◦rd,, r , r ×, ↑◦ r
′, r •, • r, r • ×, and • r×
(where r is a low thread and r′ can be either a low or a high thread) operate on low threads and are therefore low events. On
the other hand, events •rd , r , r ×, ↑• r
′, r •, • r, r • ×, and • r× (where r and r′ are high threads) are high.
With the security partition deﬁned on scheduler events, we specify the indistinguishability of scheduler conﬁgurations
via low-bisimulation. Because we only consider deterministic schedulers, an equivalent trace-based deﬁnition is possible.
However, we have chosen a bisimulation-based deﬁnition of indistinguishability because it is both intuitive and concise.
The intuition behind indistinguishability of scheduler conﬁgurations is this: A candidate relation R is a low-bisimulation if
the following conditions hold. For two conﬁgurations that are related by R, if one of them (say the ﬁrst) can make a high
step to some other conﬁguration then this other conﬁguration will be related to the second conﬁguration. If none of the
conﬁgurations can make a high step, but one of the conﬁgurations can make a low step, then the other one should also be
able to make a low step with the same label and the resulting conﬁgurations must be related by R. Formally:
Deﬁnition 1. A relation R is a low-bisimulation on scheduler conﬁgurations if whenever 〈|σ1, ν1|〉 R 〈|σ2, ν2|〉, then
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Fig. 6. Round-robin scheduler.
Note the condition “if the case above cannot be applied”, which corresponds to the case where none of the conﬁgurations
can make a high step. Scheduler conﬁgurations are low-indistinguishable if there is a low-bisimulation that relates them:
Deﬁnition 2. Scheduler conﬁgurations 〈|σ1, ν1|〉 and 〈|σ2, ν2|〉 are low-indistinguishable (written 〈|σ1, ν1|〉 ∼L 〈|σ2, ν2|〉) if there is a
low-bisimulation R such that 〈|σ1, ν1|〉 R 〈|σ2, ν2|〉.
Noninterference for schedulers requires low-bisimilarity under any memory:
Deﬁnition 3. Scheduler σ is noninterferent if 〈|σ , ν|〉 ∼L 〈|σ , ν|〉 for all ν.
Fig. 6 displays an example of a scheduler in pseudocode. This is a round-robin scheduler that keeps track of two lists of
threads: low and high ones. The scheduler interchangeably chooses between threads from these two lists, when possible. It
waits for events generated by the running thread (expressed by primitive receive). Functions head, tail, remove, and append
have the standard semantics for list operations. OperationN(d), variables t◦, t•, s, r, and q have the same purpose as described
in Section 3.2. ConstantM is a positive natural number. Variable turn encodes the interchangeable choices between low and
high threads. Function run(r) launches the execution of thread r. It is not difﬁcult to show that this schedulers complies to
the assumptions from Section 3.2, and that it is noninterferent.
Suppose the initial scheduler memory is formed according to νinit = ν[t◦ → {c} , t• → ∅, te → ∅, r → 1, s → ◦, q → 0] for
some ﬁxed ν. Security for programs is deﬁned as a form of noninterference:
Deﬁnition 4. Program c is secure if for all σ ,m1, andm2 where σ is noninterferent andm1 =L m2, we have
〈|c,m1, σ , νinit |〉 ⇓ cfg1 & 〈|c,m2, σ , νinit |〉 ⇓ cfg2 ⇒ m(cfg1) =L m(cfg2)
A form of scheduler independence is built in the deﬁnition by the universal quantiﬁcation over all noninterferent sched-
ulers. Although the universally quantiﬁed condition may appear difﬁcult to guarantee, we will show that the security type
system from Section 5 ensures that any typable program is secure. Note that this security deﬁnition is termination-insensitive
[34] in that it ignores nonterminating program runs. Our approach can be applied to termination-sensitive security in a
straightforward manner, although this is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Fig. 7. Security type system.
As common, noninterference can be expressed for a general security latticeL by quantifying over all security levels
 ∈L and demanding two-level noninterference between data at levels 1 such that 1   (acting as low) and data at levels
2 such that 2   (acting as high).
5. Security type system
This section presents a security type system that enforces the security speciﬁcation from the previous section.Weproceed
by going over the typing rules and stating the soundness theorem.
5.1. Typing rules
Fig. 7 displays the typing rules for expressions and commands. Suppose 	 is a typing environment which includes security
type information for variables (whether they are low or high) and two variables, pc and hc, ranging over security types (low
or high). By convention, we write 	v for 	 restricted to all variables but v.
Expression typing judgments have the form 	  e : τ where τ is low only if all variables in e (denoted FV(e)) are low. If
there exists a high variable that occurs in e then τ must be high. Expression types make no use of type variables pc and hc.
Command typing judgments have the form 	  c : τ . As a starting point, let us see how the rules track sequential-style
informationﬂow. Theassignment rule ensures that information cannot leak explicitlybyassigning anexpression that contains
high variables into a low variable. Further, implicit ﬂows are prevented by the program-counter mechanism [8,42]. This
mechanism ensures that no assignments to low variables are allowed in the branches of a control statement (if or while)
when the guard of the control statement has type high. (We call such if’s and while’s high.) This is achieved by the program-
counter type variable pc from the typing context 	. The intended guarantee is that whenever 	pc , pc → high  c : τ then c
may not assign to low variables. The typing rules ensure that branches of high if’s and while’s may only be typed in a high
pc context.
Security type variables hc (that describes hiding context) and τ (that describes the command type) help tracking informa-
tion ﬂow speciﬁc to the multithreaded setting. The main job of these variables is to record whether the current thread is in
the high part of the threadpool (hc = high) or is in the low part (hc = low). Command type τ reﬂects the level of the hiding
context after the command execution.
The type rules for hide and unhide raise and lower the level of the thread, respectively. Condition τe  	(hc) for typing
high if’s and while’s ensures that high control commands can only be typed under high hc, which enforces the requirement
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that high control statements should be executed by high threads.
The type system ensures that there are no fork (but possibly some hfork) commands in high control statements. This is
entailed by the rule for fork, which requires low hc.
By removing the typing rules for hide, unhide, hfork, and the security type variables hc and τ from Fig. 7, we obtain a
standard type system for securing information ﬂow in sequential programs (cf. [42]). This illustrates that our type provides
a general technique for modular extension of systems that track information ﬂow in a sequential setting.
Extending the type system to an arbitrary security latticeL is straightforward: the main modiﬁcation is that security
levels  in hide, unhide, and fork may be allowed only if the level of hc is also .
5.2. Soundness
We enlist some helpful lemmas for proving the soundness of the type system. The proofs of all lemmas, theorems, and
corollaries are reported in the appendix. The ﬁrst lemma states that high control commands must be typed with high hc.
Lemma 1. If 	  c : τ , where c = if e then c1 else c2 or c = while e do c, and 	  e : high, then 	(hc) = high.
The following lemma states that commands with high guards and hforks cannot contain hide or unhide commands as
part of them.
Lemma 2. If 	hc,pc , pc → high,hc → high  c : high, then c does not contain hide and unhide.
The following lemma states that threads in the high part of the threadpool do not update low variables.
Lemma 3. If 	hc ,hc → high  c : τ and 〈|c,m|〉 α⇀ 〈|c′,m′|〉, then m =L m′ and α /∈ {◦, •}.
The next lemma states that threads created by hfork always remain in the high part of the threadpool.
Lemma 4. If	hc,pc ,hc → high, pc → high  c : high and 〈|c,m|〉 α⇀ 〈|c′,m′|〉 and c′ /= stop, then	hc,pc ,hc → high, pc → high  c′ :
high.
As stated by the following lemma, threads that are moved to the low part of the threadpool are kept in the high part of it
until an unhide instruction is executed.
Lemma 5. If 	hc,pc , pc → τc ,hc → high  c : low for some given τc and 〈|c,m|〉 α⇀ 〈|c′,m′|〉, where c′ /= stop and α /= • r, then
	hc,pc , pc → τc ,hc → high  c′ : low.
The following lemma states that threads in the low part of the threadpool preserve low-equivalence of memories.
Lemma 6. For a given command c such that 	hc ,hc → low  c : low,memories m1 and m2 such that m1 =L m2, and 〈|c,m1|〉 α⇀
〈|c′,m′
1
|〉; it holds that 〈|c,m2|〉 α⇀ 〈|c′,m′2|〉 and m′1 =L m′2.
The next lemma states that threads remain in the low part of the threadpool as long as no hide instruction is executed.
Lemma 7. If 	hc,pc , pc → τc ,hc → low  c : low for some given τc and 〈|c,m|〉 α⇀ 〈|c′,m′|〉, where c′ /= stop and α /= r •, then
	hc,pc , pc → τc ,hc → low  c′ : low.
Another important lemma is that commands hide and unhide are matched in pairs.
Lemma 8. If 	hc ,hc → low  hide; c : low, then there exist commands c′ and p such that c ∈ {c′; unhide, unhide, c′; unhide; p,
unhide; p}, where c′ has no unhide commands.
In order to establish the security of typable commands, we need to ﬁrstly identify the following subpools of threads from
a given conﬁguration.
Deﬁnition 5. Given a scheduler memory ν and a thread pool c, we deﬁne the following subpools of threads: L(c, ν) =
{ci}i∈t◦∩N(c), H(c, ν) = {ci}i∈t•∩N(c), and EL(c, ν) = {ci}i∈te∩N(c).
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These three subpools of threads, L(c) (low), H(c) (high) and EL(c) (eventually low), behave differently when the overall
threadpool is run with low-equivalent initial memories. Threads from the low subpool match in the two runs, threads from
the high subpool do not necessarily match (but they cannot update low memories in any event), and threads from the
eventually low subpool will eventually match. The above intuition is captured by the following theorem. First, we deﬁnewhat
“eventually match” means.
Deﬁnition 6. Given a command p, we deﬁne the relation eventually low, written ∼el,p, on empty or singleton sets of threads
as follows:
– ∅ ∼el,p,∅ ∅;
– {c} ∼el,p,{n} {d} if N(c) = N(d) = n, and there exist commands c′ and d′ without unhide instructions such that c ∈
{c′; unhide, unhide} and d ∈ {d′; unhide, unhide} or c ∈ {c′; unhide; p, unhide; p} and d ∈ {d′; unhide; p, unhide; p}.
Two traces that start with low-indistinguishable memories might differ on commands (although keeping the command
type).Weneed to showthat this differencewill not affect the sequenceof low-observable events and low-observablememory
changes. In order to show this, we deﬁne an unwinding [14] property, which is similar to the low-bisimulation property for
schedulers. This unwinding property below establishes an invariant on two conﬁgurations that is preserved by low steps in
lock-step and is unchanged by high steps with any of the conﬁgurations.
Theorem 1. Given a command p and themultithreaded conﬁgurations 〈| c1,m1, σ1, ν1|〉 and 〈| c2,m2, σ2, ν2|〉 so thatm1 =L m2,writ-
ten as R1(m1,m2), N( c1) = H( c1, ν1) ∪ L( c1, ν1) ∪ EL( c1, ν1),written as R2( c1, ν1), R2( c2, ν2), sets H( c1, ν1), L( c1, ν1), and EL( c1, ν1)
are disjoint,written as R3( c1, ν1), R3( c2, ν2), L( c1, ν1) = L( c2, ν2),written as R4( c1, ν1, c2, ν2), EL( c1, ν1) ∼el,p,te1EL( c2, ν2),written as
R5( c1, ν1, c2, ν2, p), (	[hc → low]  ci : low)i∈L( c1,ν1), written as R6( c1, ν1), (	[hc → high, pc → high]  ci : high)i∈H( c1,ν1)∪H( c2,ν2),
written as R7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2), (	[hc → high]  ci : low)i∈EL( c1,ν1)∪EL( c2,ν2),written as R8( c1, ν1, c2, ν2), and 〈|σ1, ν1|〉 ∼L 〈|σ2, ν2|〉,written
as R9(σ1, ν1, σ2, ν2), then:




, then there exists p′ such that R1(m′i,m3−i), R2(c ′i, ν′i),
R2(c3−i, ν3−i), R3(c ′i, ν′i), R3(c3−i, ν3−i), R4(c ′i, ν′i , c3−i, ν3−i), R5(c ′i, ν′i , c3−i, ν3−i, p′), R6(c ′i, ν′i), R7(c ′i, ν′i , c3−i, ν3−i),
R8(c ′i, ν′i , c3−i, ν3−i), and R9(σ ′i , ν′i , σ3−i, ν3−i);





〈|c3−i,m3−i, σ3−i, ν3−i|〉 α→ 〈|c ′3−i,m′3−i, σ ′3−i, ν′3−i|〉 where there exists p′ such that R1(m′i,m′3−i), R2(c ′i, ν′i), R2(c ′3−i, ν′3−i),










Corollary 1 (Soundness). If 	hc ,hc → low  c : low then c is secure.
6. Extension to cooperative schedulers
It is possible to extend our model to cooperative schedulers. This is done by a minor modiﬁcation of the semantics and
type system rules. One can show that the results from Section 5 are preserved under these modiﬁcations.
The language is extended with primitive whose semantics is as follows:
〈|yield,m|〉⇀ 〈|stop,m|〉
The semantics for commands also needs to propagate label in the sequential composition rules.
Event signals to the scheduler that the current thread yields control. The scheduler semantics needs to react to such
an event by resetting counter q′ to 0:
q > 0 q′ = 0
〈|σ , ν|〉 r⇁ 〈|σ ′, ν′|〉
q > 0 q′ = 0 ∀α ∈ {•, ◦}.t′α = tα\{r}
〈|σ , ν|〉 r X⇁ 〈|σ ′, ν′|〉
We need to ensure that the only possibility to schedule another thread is by generating event . Hence, we add premise
q′ = ∞ to the semantics rules for schedulers that handle events↑• r′ and↑◦ r′. Additionally, the last rule in Figure4nowallows
α to range over {r •, • r, r }, which propagates yielding events from threads to the scheduler. Similar to scheduler
events r • × and • r×, a new transition is added to the threadpool semantics to include the case when yield is executed
as the last command by a thread.
At the type-system level, yielding control while inside a high control command, as well as inside hide/unhide pairs, is
potentially dangerous. These situations are avoided by a type rule for yield that restricts pc and hc to low:
	(pc) = low 	(hc) = low
	  yield : 	(hc)
A theorem that implies soundness for the modiﬁed type system can be proved similarly to Theorem 1.
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Fig. 8. Ticket purchase code.
Recently, we have suggested a mechanism for enforcing security under cooperative scheduling [28]. Besides checking for
explicit and implicit ﬂows, the mechanism ensures that there are no yield commands in high context. Similarly, the rule
above implies that yield may not appear in high context. On the other hand, the mechanism from [28] allows no dynamic
thread creation in high context. This is improved by the approach sketched in this section, because it retains the ﬂexibility
that is offered by hfork.
7. Ticket purchase example
In Section 2, we have argued that a ﬂexible treatment of dynamic thread creation is paramount for a practical security
mechanism. We illustrate, by an example, that the security type system from Section 5 offers such a permissive treatment
without compromising security.
Consider the code fragment in Fig. 8. This fragment is a part of a program that handles a ticket purchase. Variables have
subscripts indicating their security levels (l for low and h for high). Suppose fl contains public data for the ﬂight being booked
(including the class and seat details), pl contains data for the passenger being processed. Variable nl is assigned the (public)
number of frequent-ﬂier miles for ﬂight fl . Variable mh is assigned the current number of miles of passenger pl , which is
secret. Variable sh is assigned the (secret) status (e.g., BASIC or GOLD) of passenger pl . The value of sh is then stored in oh.
Variable okl records if the procedure to print a ticket has been successful.
The next line is a control statement: if the updated number mh + nl of miles exceeds 50000 then a new thread is spawn
to perform a status update updateStatus for the passenger. The status update code involves a computation for extra miles
(due to the passenger status) andmight involve a request changeStatus to the status database. As potentially time-consuming
computation, it is arranged in a separate thread. The ﬁnal computation in the main thread prints the ticket.
This programcreates threads in a high context because the guard of the if in themain threaddepends onmh. Furthermore,
the main thread contains an assignment to a low variable (okl) after the instructions that branches on secrets. Because of
this, the program is rejected by the type systems of Smith [35] as well as Boudol and Castellani [3,4]. Nevertheless, a
minor modiﬁcation of the program (which can be easily automated) by replacing if (mh + nl > 50000) then fork(sh :=
GOLD, updateStatus) with
hide;
if(mh + nl > 50000) then hfork(sh := GOLD,updateStatus)else skip;
unhide
results in a typable (and therefore secure) program.
8. Feasibility study of an implementation
As discussed in Section 2, it is important that the proposed security mechanism for regulating the interaction between
threads and the scheduler is feasible to put into effect in practice.
We have analyzed two well-known thread libraries: the GNU Pth [11] and the NPTL [10] libraries for the cooperative
and preemptive concurrent model, respectively. Generally, the cooperative model has been widely used in, for instance, GUI
programming, when few computations are performed, and most of the time the system waits for events. The preemptive
model is popular in operating systems, where preemption is essential for resource management. We have not analyzed the
libraries in full detail, focusing on a feasibility study of the presented interaction between threads and the scheduler.
The GNU Pth library is well known by its high level of portability and by only using threads in user space. This library is
suitable to implement the primitives hide and unhide as well as a scheduler based on the round-robin policy from Section 4.
Besides reacting to the commands hide and unhide, the scheduler could be modiﬁed to include one list of threads for each
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Fig. 9. Extended command syntax.
Fig. 10. Semantics for wait() and signal().
security level, in this case, low and high. Such scheduler interchangeably chooses between elements of those lists depending
on the value of s (i.e., low and high threads when s = ◦, and only high ones otherwise). Based on these ideas, the work
described in [39] implements the scheduler of a library that provides information-ﬂow security formultithreaded programs.
On the other hand, the NPTL library is more complex. It maps threads in user space to threads in kernel space by using
low-level primitives in the code. Nevertheless, it would be possible to apply the similar modiﬁcations that we described
for the GNU Pth library. The interaction between threads and the scheduler becomes more subtle in this model due to the
operations performed at the kernel space. The responsiveness of the kernel for the whole systemwould depend on temporal
properties of code wrapped by hide and unhide primitives.
9. Synchronization primitives
Synchronizationmechanismsareof fundamental importance to concurrentprograms.We focuson semaphores [9] because
they are simple yet widely used synchronization primitives. In principle, the language described in Section 3 allows synchro-
nization of threads by implementing busy waiting algorithms.Whilemaking synchronization possible, these algorithms also
introduce performance degradation. Conversely, blocked waiting, which commonly underlies semaphore implementations,
does not have this drawback. Semaphores, and generally any other mechanism based on blocked waiting, can potentially
affect the security of programs. Therefore, it is important to provide policies regarding the utilization of such primitives in
order to guarantee conﬁdentiality. In this section, we extend the language, semantics and type system described previously
to include semaphores primitives and provably show that noninterference is preserved for well-typed programs.
9.1. Extended language
The extended syntax of the language is displayed in Fig. 9. A semaphore is a special variable, written sem, that ranges
over nonnegative integers and can only bemanipulated by two commands: wait(sem) and signal(sem). We assume, without
losing generality, that every semaphore variable is initialized with 0. The semantics for these commands (in the line of
[30]) is shown in Fig. 10. Command wait(sem) blocks a thread if sem has a value of 0, indicated by event
b(sem)
⇀ , or otherwise
decrements its value by 1. Command signal(sem) triggers event
u(sem)
⇀ .
9.2. Extended semantics for schedulers
Threads that are blocked on semaphore variables cannot be scheduled. Clearly, schedulers need to know when threads
are blocked (or not) in order to decide if they can be chosen to run. For this purpose, we introduce a new scheduler variable
tw that stores the set of blocked threads. The semantic rules involving this variable are shown in Fig. 11. Rules for selecting
threads to run, represented by events ↑◦ r′ and ↑• r′, are adapted to rule out blocked threads. Observe how threads placed
in tw are removed from the possible values of r
′. Events br and ura indicate to the scheduler that threads r and a have been
blocked and unblocked, respectively. Events br× and ura× provide to the scheduler the same information as events br and ura
together with the fact that thread r has terminated.
9.3. Extended semantics for threadpools
The action of blocking and unblocking threads occurs at the level of threadpool conﬁgurations. For that reason, such
conﬁgurations are extended with FIFO queues of waiting threads. More precisely, the extended threadpool conﬁgurations
have the form 〈|c,m, σ , ν,w|〉 where w is a function from semaphores to a list of blocked threads. Semantic rules in Fig. 4 are
easily extended to consider w into account and therefore we omit the details here. Observe that the extended version of
those rules do not modify w since they do not block or unblock threads at all.
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Fig. 11. Extended semantics for schedulers.
Semantic rules for semaphore operations at the level of threadpools are shown in Fig. 12. Event brsem is triggered when
the top level conﬁguration receives a b(sem) signal and the blocked thread is placed at the end of the queue associated with
sem. When a u(sem) signal is generated by the running thread, it awakes the ﬁrst thread in the queue associated with sem
and triggers event ursem. Moreover, it communicates to the scheduler which thread has been awakened with event u
r
a. In case
that the queue associated with sem is empty, no thread is awakened and the scheduler is informed about that by event urr .
Events brsem× and ursem× are triggeredwhen threads terminatewith synchronization commands under circumstances similar
to brsem and u
r
sem, respectively.
9.4. Attacks using semaphores
Conﬁdentiality of data might be compromised if commands related to semaphores are freely allowed in programs. To
illustrate this, we show an attack in Fig. 13. The program contains semaphore variables s1, s2, p, and f , and variables h and l
to store secret and public data, respectively. The code blocks and unblocks threads that assign to public variables in an order
that depends on h. That is, the execution of l := 1 is followed by l := 0 when h ≥ 0, and l := 0 is followed by l := 1 otherwise.
Observe that the branching command presents no timing differences. Nevertheless, some information about h is revealed.
Restrictions on the use of semaphores are needed in order to avoid such leaks.
9.5. Extended security speciﬁcation
In Section 4, we state that a program is secure under some scheduler if for any two initial low-equivalence memories,
whenever the two runs of the program terminate, then the resulting memories are also low-equivalent. Since semaphores
variables are stored inprogramsmemories as anyother variables, the low-equivalent relation, asdeﬁnedpreviously, is enough
to capture the attacker’s view of memories even in the presence of semaphores. However, the notion of “conﬁguration cfg
terminates in conﬁguration cfg′” needs to be adapted. An entire program terminates if there are no blocked threads and no
threads to schedule. More precisely, cfg ⇓ cfg′ if cfg →* cfg′ where the threadpool of cfg′ is empty and the waiting queue
w(sem) is empty for every semaphore sem.
Tomaintain the assumption that schedulers are not leaky, it is necessary to extend the low-bisimulation deﬁned in Section




sem×, and ursem× is the same
as the security level of thread r. Deﬁnitions 1, 2, and 3 can be easily extended to consider such events and we therefore omit
the details here.
We introduce a low-equivalence relation on queues of waiting threads. We deﬁne such relation as =L where w1 =L w2 if
for every low semaphore sem, it holds that w1(sem) = w2(sem). We are now in condition to present the extended security
speciﬁcation:
Deﬁnition 7. Program c is secure if for all σ ,m1,m2,w1, andw2 where σ is noninterferent,m1 =L m2, andw1 =L w2, we have
〈|c,m1, σ , νinit ,w1|〉 ⇓ cfg1 & 〈|c,m2, σ , νinit ,w2|〉 ⇓ cfg2 ⇒ m(cfg1) =L m(cfg2)
9.6. Extended type system
The type system proposed in Section 5 is extended to enforce secure uses of semaphores. As for variables, semaphores
have security types (low or high) associated with them, which are included in the typing environment 	. Typing rules for
semaphore commands are depicted in Fig. 14. The ﬁrst rule establishes that signals to any semaphore can be performed in
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Fig. 12. Threadpool semantics for semaphores primitives.
Fig. 13. Attack using semaphores.
low threads. However, signals to public semaphores cannot be sent from high threads. To illustrate why this restriction is
imposed, we can think about signals on low semaphores as updates on low variables, which must be avoided inside of high
threads. The second rule imposes that threads can only wait on semaphores that matches their security level. Waiting on
semaphores at security level  in threads of security level ′, where  /= ′, might affect the timing behavior of threads at
security level  and ′. For instance, waiting on high semaphores in low threads might affect low threads timing behavior
depending on some secret data and lead to internal timing leaks. Moreover, waiting on low semaphores in high threads
might affect, also through internal timing, how assignments to public variables are performed. To illustrate this, we show
an example in Fig. 15. The code involves high thread d1, low threads d2 and d3, low semaphore sl , and variables h and l to
store secret and public information, respectively. Let us assume a scheduler that picks thread d1 ﬁrst and then proceeds to
run threads for 15 steps before yielding the control. In this case, d1 terminates before yielding. After that, depending on
the secret, two scenarios are possible. If h ≥ 0, then d2 blocks until d3 completes its execution and produces 0 as the ﬁnal
value of l. If h < 0, on the other hand, d2 is likely to execute l := 0 before d3 runs l := 1. The ﬁnal value of l is then 1, which
demonstrates that the program is insecure.
The restrictions enforced by the type system are summarized in Fig. 16. The ﬁrst and second columns describe the use
of wait() and signal(), respectively. The ﬁrst and second rows describe the use of semaphores in low and high threads,
respectively. In addition, sl (resp., sh) means that low (resp., high) semaphores can be safely used.
9.7. Soundness of the extension
It is straightforward to see that the lemmas in Section 5.2 hold for the extended language. In fact, the requirements on
their typing rules can be thought as requirements for assignments of some variables where their security levels have hc
as lower bound. This condition is weaker than the one applied in the typing rule for assignments. Consequently, it is not
surprising that every lemma holds considering the synchronization primitives wait and signal.
In order to prove the security of typable commands, we deﬁne an operator N(w) that returns, for every semaphore sem,
the thread identiﬁers in w(sem). We then identify the following subpools of blocked threads for a given conﬁguration.
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Fig. 14. Typing rules from synchronization primitives.
Fig. 15. Waiting on low semaphores in high threads.
Fig. 16. Secure use of semaphores.
Deﬁnition 8. Given a scheduler memory ν and a function w from semaphores to a list of blocked threads, we deﬁne the
following subpools of blocked threads: BL(w, ν) = {ci}i∈t◦∩N(w), BH(w, ν) = {ci}i∈t•∩N(w), and BEL(w, ν) = {ci}i∈te∩N(w).
Deﬁnition 6 is extended to include the fact that eventually low threadsmight be blocked on high semaphores. The notion
of “eventually match” is now described in terms of tuples. The status, blocked or unblocked, of such threads depends on
which components of the tuples they are situated. More precisely, we have the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 9. Given a command p, we deﬁne the relation eventually low, written ∼el,p, on tuples of empty or singleton sets
of threads as follows:
∅, ∅ ∼el,p,∅ ∅, ∅; ∅, {c} ∼el,p,{n} {d}, ∅; ∅, {c} ∼el,p,{n} ∅, {d};
{c}, ∅ ∼el,p,{n} {d}, ∅; {c}, ∅ ∼el,p,{n} ∅, {d} ;
where N(c) = N(d) = n, and there exist commands c′ and d′ without unhide instructions such that c ∈ {c′; unhide, unhide}
and d ∈ {d′; unhide, unhide} or c ∈ {c′; unhide; p, unhide; p} and d ∈ {d′; unhide; p, unhide; p}.
The following deﬁnition indicates that blocked high and low threads are placed in the waiting list of high and low
semaphores, respectively.
Deﬁnition 10. Given a typing environment 	, an scheduler memory ν, and queues of blocked threads, we deﬁne w  v
iff for any sem ∈ dom(w) such that w(sem) = ci1ci2 . . . cik where k ≥ 0, {i1, i2, . . . , ik} ⊆ ν.t• ∪ ν.te whether 	(sem) = high, and{i1, i2, . . . , ik} ⊆ ν.t◦ whether 	(sem) = low.
This leads us to the following soundness theorem, which extends Theorem 1 with invariants R10−17 concerning blocked
threads.
Theorem 2. Given a command p and the multithreaded conﬁgurations 〈| c1,m1, σ1, ν1 ,w1|〉 and 〈| c2,m2, σ2, ν2,w2|〉 so that
R1(m1,m2), R2( c1, ν1), R2( c2, ν2), R3( c1, ν1), R3( c2, ν2), R4( c1, ν1, c2, ν2), the eventually low relationship BEL(w1, ν1), EL( c1, ν1)
∼el,p,te1 EL( c2, ν2), BEL(w2, ν2),written as R5 ( c1,w1, ν1, c2,w2, ν2, p), R6( c1, ν1), R7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2), R8( c1, ν1, c2, ν2), R9(σ1, ν1, σ2, ν2),
N(w1) = BL(w1, ν1) ∪ BH( w1, ν1) ∪ BEL(w1, ν1), written R10(w1, ν1), R10(w2, ν2), sets BH(w1, ν1), BL(w1, ν1), BEL( w1, ν1), and
N( c1) are disjoint, written as R11( w1, ν1), R11(w2, ν2), BL(w1, ν1) = BL(w2, ν2), written as R12(w1, ν1,w2, ν2), (	[hc → low] 
ci : low)i∈BL(w1,ν1),written as R13(w1, ν1), (	[hc → high, pc → high]  ci : high)i∈BH(w1,ν1)∪BH(w2,ν2),written as R14(w1, ν1,w2, ν2),
(	[hc → high]  ci : low)i∈BEL(w1,ν1)∪BEL(w2,ν1), written as R15(w1, ν1,w2, ν2), w1 =L w2, written as R16(w1,w2), w1  ν1, written
as R17(w1, ν1), R17(w2, ν2), then:




, then there exists p′ such that R1(m′i,m3−i), R2(c ′i, ν′i),
R2(c3−i, ν3−i),R3(c ′i, ν′i),R3(c3−i,ν3−i),R4(c ′i, ν′i , c3−i, ν3−i),R5(c ′i,w′i , ν′i , c3−i,w3−i, ν3−i, p′),R6( c ′i, ν′i),R7 (c ′i, ν′i , c3−i, ν3−i),











,w3−i, ν3−i), R15(w′i , ν
′
i





), and R17(w3−i, ν3−i);
(ii) if the above case cannot be applied, and given 〈| ci,mi, σi, νi,wi|〉 where BEL(wi , νi) /= ∅, then R1(mi,m3−i), R2(c i, νi),
R2(c3−i, ν3−i), R3(c i, νi), R3(c3−i, ν3−i), R4(c i, νi, c3−i, ν3−i), R5(c i,wi, νi,w3−i, c3−i, ν3−i, p), R6(c i, νi), R7 (c i, νi, c3−i, ν3−i),
R8(c i, νi, c3−i, ν3−i), and R9(σi, νi, σ3−i, ν3−i), R10 (wi, νi), R10 (w3−i, ν3−i), R11(wi, νi), R11(w3−i, ν3−i), R12(wi, νi,w3−i, ν3−i),
R13(wi , νi), R14(wi, νi, w3−i, ν3−i), R15(wi, νi,w3−i, ν3−i), R16(wi,w3−i), R17(wi, νi), and R17(w3−i, ν3−i);
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〈|c3−i,m3−i, σ3−i, ν3−i,w3−i|〉 α→ 〈|c ′3−i,m′3−i, σ ′3−i, ν′3−i,w′3−i|〉 where there exists p′ such that R1(m′i,m′3−i), R2(c ′i, ν′i),
R2( c ′3−i, ν′3−i), R3(c ′i, ν′i), R3(c ′3−i, ν′3−i), R4(c ′i, ν′i , c ′3−i, ν′3−i), R5(c ′i, ν′i ,w′i , c ′3−i, w′3−i, ν′3−i, p′), R6(c ′i, ν′i), R7(c ′i, ν′i , c ′3−i,
ν′





































Compared with Theorems 1 and 2 has new invariants, described by R10–R17, and applies the extended deﬁnition of the
eventually low relationship in R5. Intuitively, invariants R10 and R11 establish that the subpools of blocked threads introduced
in Deﬁnition 8 form a partition of the blocked threads found in the conﬁguration. Invariant R12 determines that the subpools
of low blocked threads are the same in both conﬁgurations. Invariants R13–R15 establish the typing requirements for the
subpools of blocked threads. A subpool of blocked threads at some security level is typed under the same circumstances that
live threads at that security level. Observe the similarities between R6–R8 and R13–R15. Invariant R16 establishes that threads
blocked on low semaphores are the same in both conﬁgurations. Invariant R17 determines that the blocked threads present
in the conﬁguration match the blocked threads registered by the scheduler.
Corollary 2 (Soundness). If 	hc ,hc → low  c : low then c is secure.
10. Conclusion
We have argued for a tight interaction between threads and the scheduler in order to guarantee secure information ﬂow
inmultithreaded programs. In conclusion,we revisit the goals set in the paper’s introduction and report the degree of success
meeting these goals.
Permissiveness: A key improvement over previous approaches is a permissive, yet secure, treatment of dynamic thread
creation. Even if threads are created in a sensitive context, the ﬂexible scheduling mechanism allows these threads to
perform useful computation. This is particularly satisfying because it is an encouraged pattern to perform time-consuming
computation (such as establishing network connections) in separate threads [19,20].
Scheduler-independence: In contrast to known approaches to internal timing-sensitive approaches, the underlying security
speciﬁcation is robust with respect to a wide class of schedulers. However, the schedulers supported by the deﬁnition need
to satisfy a form of noninterference that disallows information transfer from threads created in a sensitive context to threads
with publicly observable effects. Sections 4 and 8 argue that such scheduler properties are not difﬁcult to achieve.
Realistic semantics: The underlying semantics does not appeal to the nonstandard construct protect. The semantics, however,
features additional hide, unhide, and hfork primitives. In contrast to protect, these features are directly implementable, as
discussed in Section 8.
Language expressiveness: As discussed earlier, a ﬂexible treatment of dynamic thread creation is a part of our model. So
is synchronization, as elaborated in Section 9. Note that our typing rules do not force a separated use of low and high
semaphores by low and high threads, respectively. For example, signaling on a high semaphore by a low thread is allowed.
However, input/output primitives are also desirable features. We expect a natural extension of our model with input/output
primitives on channels labeled with security levels, similarly to semaphores that operate on different security levels. For the
two-point security lattice, we imagine the following extension of the type system. Low channels would allow low threads
to input to low variables and to output low expressions: similarly to low semaphores s that permit low threads to execute
both P(s) and V(s) operations. High channels would allow high threads to input/output data and allow low threads to output
data: similarly to high semaphores that allow high threads s to perform both P(s) and V(s) operations and allow low threads
to perform V(s). Formalizing this intuition is subject to our future work.
Practical enforcement: We have demonstrated that security can be enforced for both cooperative and preemptive schedulers
using a compositional type system. The type system accommodates permissive programming. We have illustrated by an
example in Section 7 that the permissiveness of dynamic thread creation is not majorly restricted by the type system. The
type system does not involve padding to eliminate timing leaks at the cost of efﬁciency.
Most recently, togetherwith Barthe and Rezk [5], we have adapted our type system to an unstructured assembly language.
Our future work plans include handling richer low-level languages (such as languages with exceptions and bytecode) and
facilitating tool support for them.
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Appendix
Lemma 1. If 	  c : τ , where c = if e then c1 else c2 or c = while e do c, and 	  e : high, then 	(hc) = high.
Proof. By inspection of the typing rules for if and while. 
Lemma 2. If 	hc,pc , pc → high,hc → high  c : high, then c does not contain hide and unhide.
Proof. By simple induction on the typing derivation. 
Lemma 3. If 	hc ,hc → high  c : τ and 〈|c,m|〉 α⇀ 〈|c′,m′|〉, then m =L m′ and α /∈ {◦, •}.
Proof. By induction on the type derivation of c. 
Lemma 4. If	hc,pc ,hc → high, pc → high  c : high and 〈|c,m|〉 α⇀ 〈|c′,m′|〉 and c′ /= stop, then	hc,pc ,hc → high, pc → high  c′ :
high.
Proof. By case analysis on c and inspection of the typing rules. 
Lemma 5. If 	hc,pc , pc → τc ,hc → high  c : low for some given τc and 〈|c,m|〉 α⇀ 〈|c′,m′|〉, where c′ /= stop and α /= • r, then
	hc,pc , pc → τc ,hc → high  c′ : low.
Proof. By case analysis on c. Observe that the only typable command under the hypothesis of the lemma is the sequential
composition. 
Lemma 6. For a given command c such that 	hc ,hc → low  c : low,memories m1 and m2 such that m1 =L m2, and 〈|c,m1|〉 α⇀
〈|c′,m′
1
|〉; it holds that 〈|c,m2|〉 α⇀ 〈|c′,m′2|〉 and m′1 =L m′2.
Proof. By case analysis on c and by exploring its type derivation. 
Lemma 7. If 	hc,pc , pc → τc ,hc → low  c : low for some given τc and 〈|c,m|〉 α⇀ 〈|c′,m′|〉, where c′ /= stop and α /= r •, then
	hc,pc , pc → τc ,hc → low  c′ : low.
Proof. By case analysis on c and inspection of the typing rules. 
Lemma 8. If 	hc ,hc → low  hide; c : low, then there exist commands c′ and p such that c ∈ {c′; unhide, unhide, c′; unhide; p,
unhide; p}, where c′ has no unhide commands.
Proof. By induction on the size of command c. 
Theorem 1. Given a command p and themultithreaded conﬁgurations 〈| c1,m1, σ1, ν1|〉 and 〈| c2,m2, σ2, ν2|〉 so thatm1 =L m2,writ-
ten as R1(m1,m2), N( c1) = H( c1, ν1) ∪ L( c1, ν1) ∪ EL( c1, ν1),written as R2( c1, ν1), R2( c2, ν2), sets H( c1, ν1), L( c1, ν1), and EL( c1, ν1)
are disjoint,written as R3( c1, ν1), R3( c2, ν2), L( c1, ν1) = L( c2, ν2),written as R4( c1, ν1, c2, ν2), EL( c1, ν1) ∼el,p,te1EL( c2, ν2),written as
R5( c1, ν1, c2, ν2, p), (	[hc → low]  ci : low)i∈L( c1,ν1), written as R6( c1, ν1), (	[hc → high, pc → high]  ci : high)i∈H( c1,ν1)∪H( c2,ν2),
written as R7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2), (	[hc → high]  ci : low)i∈EL( c1,ν1)∪EL( c2,ν2),written as R8( c1, ν1, c2, ν2), and 〈|σ1, ν1|〉 ∼L 〈|σ2, ν2|〉,written
as R9(σ1, ν1, σ2, ν2), then:




, then there exists p′ such that R1(m′i,m3−i),
R2(c ′i, ν′i), R2(c3−i, ν3−i),R3(c ′i, ν′i),R3(c3−i,ν3−i),R4(c ′i, ν′i , c3−i, ν3−i),R5(c ′i, ν′i , c3−i, ν3−i, p′),R6(c ′i, ν′i),R7(c ′i, ν′i , c3−i, ν3−i),
R8(c ′i, ν′i , c3−i, ν3−i), and R9(σ ′i , ν′i , σ3−i, ν3−i);





〈|c3−i,m3−i, σ3−i, ν3−i|〉 α→ 〈|c ′3−i,m′3−i, σ ′3−i, ν′3−i|〉 where there exists p′ such that R1(m′i,m′3−i), R2(c ′i, ν′i), R2(c ′3−i, ν′3−i),
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Proof. By case analysis on command/scheduler steps. We are only going to show the proofs for the mentioned commands
when the conﬁguration 〈| c1,m1, σ1, ν1|〉 makes some progress. We assume that the thread cr belongs to c1 . Analogous proofs
are obtainedwhen 〈| c2,m2, σ2, ν2|〉makes progress instead.Wemake a distinction if the systemperforms an step that produces
a low or a high event.
(i) High events •rd , , r ×, and ↑• r
′ (where {r, r′} ⊆ H( c1, ν1) ∪ EL( c1, ν1)).
(α1 = •rd) By inspecting the semantics for threadpools and the scheduler, we know that cr ∈ H( c1, ν1) or cr ∈ EL( c1, ν1)




) = H( c1, ν1) ∪ N(d). R1(m′1,m′2) holds trivially since hfork has no changed the memories. R2( c1′, ν′1),
R2( c2, ν2), R3( c1′, ν′1), and R3( c2, ν2), hold since R2( c1, ν1), R2( c2, ν2), R3( c1, ν1), and R3( c2, ν2) hold, and by inspecting
the semantics for the scheduler together with the fact that N(d) are fresh names for threads. R4( c1′, ν′1, c2, ν2) holds
since R4( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and because the transition α1 does not affect the low threads (only high threads were
created). For a similar reason, R6( c1′, ν′1) also holds. R9(σ ′1, ν′1, σ2, ν2) holds since R9(σ1, ν1, σ2, ν2) holds and by applying
the deﬁnition of ∼L .
In order to prove R5( c1′, ν′1, c2, ν2, p′), R7( c1′, ν′1, c2, ν2), and R8( c1′, ν′1, c2, ν2), we need to split the proof in two more
cases: cr ∈ H( c1, ν1) and cr ∈ EL( c1, ν1).
(cr ∈ H( c1, ν1)) By taking p′ = p, we have that R5( c′1, ν′1, c2, ν2, p) and proposition R8( c′1, ν′1, c2, ν2) hold because
R5( c1, ν1, c2, ν2, p), and R8( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) hold; and because the eventually low thread, if there exists one, has





, c2, ν2) holds since R7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and by applying Lemma 4 to cr .
(cr ∈ EL( c1, ν1)) Since R5( c1, ν1, c2, ν2, p) holds, we know that the thread with name r belongs to the threadpool c2.
Moreover, we know that cr =hfork(c, d); c′; unhide, cr = hfork(c, d); unhide, cr = hfork(c, d); c′; unhide; p, or






, c2, ν2) holds by Lemma 5. Finally, R7( c′1, ν′1, c2, ν2) holds since R7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and because high
threads have made no progress.
(α1 = ) We split the proof in two more cases: cr ∈ H( c1, ν1) and cr ∈ EL( c1, ν1).
(cr ∈ H( c1, ν1)) R1(m′1,m2) holds by applying Lemma 3. R2( c1′, ν′1), R2( c2, ν2), R3( c1′, ν′1), and R3( c2, ν2), hold since
R2( c1, ν1),R2( c2, ν2),R3( c1, ν1), andR3( c2, ν2)hold, andby inspecting the semantics for the scheduler.R4( c1′, ν′1,c2, ν2) holds since R4( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and because the transition α1 does not affect the low threads. For a
similar reason,R6( c1′, ν′1) also holds.R7( c′1, ν′1, c2, ν2)holds sinceR7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2)holds andby applying Lemma
4. By taking p′ = p, we have that R5( c′1, ν′1, c2, ν2, p′) and R8( c′1, ν′1, c2, ν2) hold because R5( c1, ν1, c2, ν2, p), and






, σ2, ν2) holds since R9(σ1, ν1, σ2, ν2) holds and by applying the deﬁnition of ∼L .
(cr ∈ EL( c1, ν1)) R1(m′1,m2) holds by applying Lemma 5. R2( c1′, ν′1), R2( c2, ν2), R3( c1′, ν′1), and R3( c2, ν2), hold since
R2( c1, ν1), R2( c2, ν2), R3( c1, ν1), and R3( c2, ν2) hold, and by inspecting the semantics for the scheduler. R4( c1′,
ν′
1
, c2, ν2) holds since R4( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and because the transition α1 does not affect the low threads.
For a similar reason, R6( c1′, ν′1) also holds. Since R5( c1, ν1, c2, ν2, p) holds, we know that cr = c′; unhide, cr =
unhide, cr = c′; unhide; p, or cr = unhide; p for some command c′ without unhide instructions. However,
cr /= unhide; p and cr /= unhide since α1 = . The proof proceeds similarly when cr = c′; unhide or cr =
c′; unhide; p. Therefore, we only show the latter case. By inspecting the semantics for commands, we know
that 〈|cr ,m1|〉 ⇀ 〈|c′r ,m′1|〉, where c′r = c′′; unhide; p where 〈|c′,m1|〉 ⇀ 〈|c′′,m′1|〉 and c′′ /= stop or c′r = unhide; p.
By taking p′ = p, we can conclude that R5( c′1, ν′1, c2, ν2, p′) holds by Deﬁnition 6. R7( c′1, ν′1, c2, ν2) holds since
R7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and because the transition α1 does not involve high threads. R8( c′1, ν′1, c2, ν2) hold by





, σ2, ν2) holds since R9(σ1, ν1, σ2, ν2) holds and by applying the deﬁnition of
∼L .
(α1 = ×) We need to split the proof in two more cases: cr ∈ H( c1, ν1) and cr ∈ EL( c1, ν1).
(cr ∈ H( c1, ν1)) R1(m′1,m2) holds by applying Lemma 3. R2( c1′, ν′1), R2( c2, ν2), R3( c1′, ν′1), and R3( c2, ν2), hold since
R2( c1, ν1),R2( c2, ν2),R3( c1, ν1), andR3( c2, ν2)hold, andby inspecting the semantics for the scheduler.R4( c1′, ν′1,c2, ν2) holds since R4( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and because the transition α1 does not affect the low threads. For
a similar reason, R6( c1′, ν′1) also holds. R7( c′1, ν′1, c2, ν2) holds since R7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and because the
thread cr has ﬁnished. By taking p
′ = p, we have that R5( c′1, ν′1, c2, ν2, p) and R8( c′1, ν′1, c2, ν2) hold because
R5( c1, ν1, c2, ν2, p), and R8( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) hold; and because the eventually low thread, if there exists one, has





, σ2, ν2) holds since R9(σ1, ν1, σ2, ν2) holds and by applying the deﬁnition of ∼L .
(cr ∈ EL( c1, ν1)) The eventually low thread cannot make progress and ﬁnishes immediately. Observe that cr must
be typable as	[hc → high]  cr : low and itmust terminate in one step. Therefore, cr = unhidebut this cannot
occur since α1 = ×.
(α1 =↑• r′) By taking p′ = p, we have that R1(m′1,m2), R2( c1′, ν′1), R2( c2, ν2), R3( c1′, ν′1), R3( c2, ν2), R4( c1′, ν′1, c2, ν2), R5( c′1, ν′1,
c2, ν2, p′), R6( c1′, ν′1), R7 ( c′1, ν′1, c2, ν2), and R8( c′1, ν′1, c2, ν2) holds since R1(m1,m2), R2( c1, ν1), R2( c2, ν2), R3( c1, ν1),
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R3( c2, ν2), R4( c1, ν1, c2, ν2), R5( c1, ν1, c2, ν2, p), R6( c1, ν1), R7 ( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) and R8( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) hold and because the





, σ2, ν2) holds since R9(σ1, ν1, σ2, ν2) holds and
by applying the deﬁnition of ∼L .
(ii) Low events: ◦rd , r , ×, ↑◦ r
′, r •, • re, r • ×, and • re× (where {r, r′} ⊆ L( c1, ν1) and re ∈ te1EL( c1, ν1)).
(α1 = ◦rd) By inspecting the semantics for threadpools, the scheduler, and commands, we have that cr ∈ L( c1, ν1), and that
cr = fork(c, d) or cr = fork(c, d); c* for some commands c and c*. We are only going to show the proof for the case
when cr = fork(c, d); c* since the proof for cr = fork(c, d) proceeds in a similar way. By inspecting the semantics
for threadpools and commands, we have the transition 〈|cr ,m1|〉
◦d













|〉. In addition to that,wealso knowthat cr ∈ L( c2, ν2)
sinceL( c2, ν2) = L( c1, ν1), and that 〈|cr ,m2|〉
◦d
⇀ 〈|c; c*,m2|〉.Wecanthereforeconclude that 〈| c2,m2, σ2, ν2|〉
◦rd






) holds by applying Lemma 6. R2( c1′, ν′1), R2( c2′, ν′2), R3( c1′, ν′1), and R3( c2′, ν′2) hold since propositions
R2( c1, ν1), R2( c2, ν2), R3( c1, ν1), and R3( c2, ν2) holds, and by inspecting the semantics for the scheduler together with
the fact that N(d) are fresh names for threads. R4( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2) holds since R4( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and because the
transitionα1 added the samenew lowthreads toboth conﬁgurations. By takingp
′ = p,wehave thatR5( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2, p)
holds since proposition R5( c1, ν1, c2, ν2, p) holds and because the eventually low thread, if exists one, has made no
progress. R6( c1′, ν′1)holds since R6( c1, ν1)holds and by inspecting the Lemma7. R7( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2)holds R7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2)
holds and because high threads have been not modiﬁed by the low step α1. R8( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2) holds R8( c1, ν1, c2, ν2)
holds and because the eventually low threads in both conﬁgurations, if they exists, have been not modiﬁed by the









) holds since R9(σ1, ν1, σ2, ν2) holds and by applying the deﬁnition of ∼L .
(α1 = r ) By inspecting the semantics rules for threadpools, the scheduler, and commands, we have that cr ∈ L( c1, ν1),











|〉. In addition to that, we also know that cr ∈ L( c2, ν2) since L( c2, ν2) = L( c1, ν1), and that 〈|cr ,m2|〉 ⇀ 〈|c′,m2|〉.






) holds by applying Lemma 6 to cr . R2( c1′, ν′1), R2( c2′, ν′2), R3( c1′, ν′1), and R3( c2′, ν′2) hold since R2( c1, ν1),
R2( c2, ν2), R3( c1, ν1), and R3( c2, ν2) holds, and by inspecting the semantics for the scheduler. R4( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2) holds
since R4( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and by applying Lemma 6 to cr . By taking p′ = p, we have that R5( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2, p) holds
since R5( c1, ν1, c2, ν2, p) holds and because the eventually low threads, if they exist, havemade no progress. R6( c1′, ν′1)
holds since R6( c1, ν1) holds and by applying Lemma 7 to cr . R7( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2) holds since R7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) and because
high threads have been not modiﬁed by the transition α1. R8( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2) holds since R8( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and










) holds since R9(σ1, ν1, σ2, ν2) holds and by applying the deﬁnition of ∼L .
(α1 = r ×) By inspecting the semantics for threadpools, the scheduler, and commands, we have that cr ∈ L( c1, ν1),












|〉. Inaddition to that,wealsoknowthat cr ∈ L( c2, ν2) sinceL( c2, ν2)= L( c1, ν1), and that 〈|cr ,m2|〉 ⇀ 〈|stop,m2|〉.






) holds by applying Lemma 6 to cr . R2( c1′, ν′1), R2( c2′, ν′2), R3( c1′, ν′1), and R3( c2′, ν′2) hold since R2( c1, ν1),
R2( c2, ν2), R3( c1, ν1), and R3( c2, ν2) hold, and by inspecting the semantics for the scheduler (observe that the thread
cr has just terminated). R4( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2) holds since R4( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and by applying Lemma 6 to cr . By taking
p′ = p, we have that R5( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2, p) holds since R5( c1, ν1, c2, ν2, p) holds and because the eventually low threads,
if they exist, have made no progress. R6( c1′, ν′1) holds since R6( c1, ν1) holds and cr /∈ L(c ′1, ν′1). R7( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2) holds
since R7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and because high threads have been not modiﬁed by the transition α1. R8( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2)
holds since R8( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and because the eventually low threads in both conﬁgurations, if they exists, have









) holds since R9(σ1, ν1, σ2, ν2) holds and by applying the
deﬁnition of ∼L .













|〉. We can therefore conclude that the transition
〈| c2,m2, σ2, ν2|〉
↑◦r′
⇀ 〈| c2′,m′2, σ ′2, ν′2|〉 holds.
Letus takep′ = p. Then,wehave thatR1(m′1,m′2),R2( c1′, ν′1),R2( c2′, ν′2),R3( c1′, ν′1),R3( c2′, ν′2),R4( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2),R5( c1′, ν′1,
c2′, ν′2, p′),R6( c1′, ν′1),R7 ( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2),R8( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2)holds sinceR1(m1,m2),R2( c1, ν1),R2( c2,ν2),R3( c1, ν1),R3( c2, ν2),
R4( c1, ν1, c2, ν2), R5( c1, ν1, c2, ν2, p), R6( c1, ν1), R7 ( c1, ν1, c2, ν2), R8( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and because the transition has









) holds since R9(σ1, ν1, σ2, ν2) holds and by applying the
deﬁnition of ∼L .
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(α1 = r •) By inspecting the semantics for threadpools, the scheduler, and commands, we have that cr = hide; c* for






|〉. We also know that 〈|cr ,m2|〉 •⇀ 〈|c′r ,m2|〉 since
L( c1) = L( c2). Moreover, we know that 〈|σ1, ν1|〉 ∼L 〈|σ2, ν2|〉 and α1 is low, we also have that 〈|σ2, ν2|〉 r •⇁ 〈|σ ′2, ν′2|〉. We can
thus conclude that the transition 〈| c2,m2, σ2, ν2|〉 r •⇀ 〈| c2′,m′2, σ ′2, ν′2|〉 holds.
We know that EL( c1) = ∅ because a low thread was scheduled to produce the event r •. Then, EL( c2) = ∅ since
R5( c1, ν1, c2, ν2, p) holds. By applying Lemma 8 to cr , we know that c* = c′; unhide, c* = unhide, c* = c′; unhide; p*, or








= m1 andm′2 = m2. R2( c1′, ν′1), R2( c2′, ν′2), R3( c1′, ν′1), R3( c2′, ν′2), and R4( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2) hold
since the following equalities EL( c1, ν1) = EL( c2, ν2) = ∅ hold, (L( ci ′, ν′i) = L( ci, νi)\{cr})i=1,2, and (EL( ci ′, ν′i) = {cr})i=1,2
hold by inspecting the semantics for threadpools and the scheduler.
In the cases where c* = c′; unhide or c* = unhide, R5( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2, p′) holds by taking p′ = skip (see Deﬁnition 6).
On the other cases, by taking p′ = p*, we know that R5( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2, p*) holds because the application of Lemma 8
gave us the appropriate p* that satisﬁes Deﬁnition 6. R6( c1′, ν′1) holds since L( c1′, ν′1) = L( c1, ν1)\{cr} and R6( c1, ν1)
hold. R7( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2) holds since proposition R7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and because high threads have been not mod-
iﬁed by the transition α1. R8( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2) holds since R8( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and by inspecting the type deriva-









) holds since R9(σ1, ν1, σ2, ν2) holds and by applying the deﬁnition of
∼L .
(α1 = • re) We know that re ∈ te1 . By inspecting the semantics for threadpools, the scheduler, and commands, we have
that cre = unhide; c* or cre = unhide for some command c*, cre ∈ EL( c1, ν1), 〈|cre ,m1|〉
•





|〉. We are only going to consider the case when cre = unhide; c* since the proof for cre = unhide is analogous.
Therefore, we omit the proof when α1 = • re×.
Because 〈|σ1, ν1|〉 ∼L 〈|σ2, ν2|〉 and α1 is low, we also have that 〈|σ2, ν2|〉 • re⇁ 〈|σ ′2, ν′2|〉. Because R5( c1, ν1, c2, ν2, p) holds, we
know that c* = p and that the thread with name re belongs to the threadpool c2 as well. Let us call it c2re . Since
R5( c1, ν1, c2, ν2, p) holds and it is not possible for a thread to make progress by a high computation, we have that c2re =
unhide; p. Asaconsequenceof that, itholds that 〈|c2re ,m2|〉
•







) holds trivially since unhide has no changed the memories. R2( c1′, ν′1), R2( c2′, ν′2), R3( c1′, ν′1), and R3( c2′, ν′2)
hold since R2( c1, ν1), R2( c2, ν2), R3( c1, ν1), and R3( c2, ν2) holds; and by inspecting the semantics for the scheduler.
R4( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2) holds since R4( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and because after the transition α1, the threads cre and c2re become








) = ∅. Then, by taking
p′ = skip, it trivially holds that R5( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2, skip). R6( c1′, ν′1) holds since R5( c1, ν1, c2, ν2, p) and R7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2, p)
holds ; and by inspecting the type derivation of cre . R7( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2) holds since R7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and because










) holds since R9(σ1, ν1, σ2, ν2) holds and by applying the deﬁnition of ∼L .
(α1 = r ×) We know that r ∈ t◦1 . The hypothesis in the theorem state that cr must be typable as 	[hc → low]  cr : low
by R6( c1, ν1). Observe that when cr = hide this requirement is violated. Therefore, this event can never occur under
the given hypothesis. 
Corollary 1. If 	hc ,hc → low  c : low then c is secure.
Proof. For arbitrary σ ,m1, andm2 so thatm1 =L m2 and σ is noninterferent, assume 〈|c,m1, σ , νinit |〉 ⇓ cfg1 & 〈|c,m2, σ , νinit |〉 ⇓
cfg2. By inductive (in the number of transition steps of the above conﬁgurations) application of Theorem 1, we propagate
invariantm1 =L m2 to the terminating conﬁgurations. 
Theorem 2. Given a command p and the multithreaded conﬁgurations 〈| c1,m1, σ1, ν1 ,w1|〉 and 〈| c2,m2, σ2, ν2,w2|〉 so that
R1(m1,m2), R2( c1, ν1), R2( c2, ν2), R3( c1, ν1), R3( c2, ν2), R4( c1, ν1, c2, ν2), the eventually low relationship BEL(w1, ν1), EL( c1, ν1)
∼el,p,te1 EL( c2, ν2), BEL(w2, ν2),written as R5 ( c1,w1, ν1, c2,w2, ν2, p), R6( c1, ν1), R7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2), R8( c1, ν1, c2, ν2), R9(σ1, ν1, σ2, ν2),
N(w1) = BL(w1, ν1) ∪ BH( w1, ν1) ∪ BEL(w1, ν1), written R10(w1, ν1), R10(w2, ν2), sets BH(w1, ν1), BL(w1, ν1), BEL( w1, ν1), and
N( c1) are disjoint, written as R11( w1, ν1), R11(w2, ν2), BL(w1, ν1) = BL(w2, ν2), written as R12(w1, ν1,w2, ν2), (	[hc → low] 
ci : low)i∈BL(w1,ν1),written as R13(w1, ν1), (	[hc → high, pc → high]  ci : high)i∈BH(w1,ν1)∪BH(w2,ν2),written as R14(w1, ν1,w2, ν2),
(	[hc → high]  ci : low)i∈BEL(w1,ν1)∪BEL(w2,ν1), written as R15(w1, ν1,w2, ν2), w1 =L w2, written as R16(w1,w2), w1  ν1, written
as R17(w1, ν1), R17(w2, ν2), then:




, then there exists p′ such that R1(m′i,m3−i), R2(c ′i, ν′i),
R2(c3−i, ν3−i),R3(c ′i, ν′i),R3(c3−i,ν3−i),R4(c ′i, ν′i , c3−i, ν3−i),R5(c ′i,w′i , ν′i , c3−i,w3−i, ν3−i, p′),R6( c ′i, ν′i),R7 (c ′i, ν′i , c3−i, ν3−i),











,w3−i, ν3−i), R15(w′i , ν
′
i





), and R17(w3−i, ν3−i);
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(ii) if the above case cannot be applied, and given 〈| ci,mi, σi, νi,wi|〉 where BEL(wi , νi) /= ∅, then R1(mi,m3−i), R2(c i, νi),
R2(c3−i, ν3−i), R3(c i, νi), R3(c3−i, ν3−i), R4(c i, νi, c3−i, ν3−i), R5(c i,wi, νi,w3−i, c3−i, ν3−i, p), R6(c i, νi), R7 (c i, νi, c3−i, ν3−i),
R8(c i, νi, c3−i, ν3−i), and R9(σi, νi, σ3−i, ν3−i), R10 (wi, νi), R10 (w3−i, ν3−i), R11(wi, νi), R11(w3−i, ν3−i), R12(wi, νi,w3−i, ν3−i),
R13(wi , νi), R14(wi, νi, w3−i, ν3−i), R15(wi, νi,w3−i, ν3−i), R16(wi,w3−i), R17(wi, νi), and R17(w3−i, ν3−i);





〈|c3−i,m3−i, σ3−i, ν3−i,w3−i|〉 α→ 〈|c ′3−i,m′3−i, σ ′3−i, ν′3−i,w′3−i|〉 where there exists p′ such that R1(m′i,m′3−i),















































Proof. By case analysis on command/scheduler steps. We are only going to show the proofs for commands related to
synchronization and unhide when the conﬁguration 〈| c1,m1, σ1, ν1|〉 makes some progress. The proof for other commands
proceeds similarly as in Theorem 1. We assume that the thread cr belongs to c1 . Analogous proofs are obtained when
〈| c2,m2, σ2, ν2|〉 makes progress instead.
(i) High events related to synchronization: brsem, b
r
sem×, ursem, and ursem× (where r ∈ H( c1, ν1) ∪ EL( c1, ν1)).
(α1 = brsem)
(cr ∈ H( c1, ν1)) R1(m′1,m2) holds by inspecting the semantics of threadpools and applying Lemma 3 to cr . By
inspecting the threadpool semantics and since cr has been blocked, we have thatN(c1 ′) = N(c1) \ {cr}. More-
over,wehave thatN(c ′
1
) = H(c1, ν1) ∪ L( c1, ν1) ∪ EL( c1, ν1) \ {cr}.WealsoknowthatH( c1′, ν′1) = H( c1, ν1) \ {cr}
since r ∈ t•1 and cr has been blocked. By this last fact and R3( c1, ν1), it holds R2( c1′, ν′1) as expected. R2( c2, ν2)
holds since it already holds by hypothesis. R3( c1′, ν′1) holds since R3( c1, ν1) holds and H( c1′, ν′1) = H( c1, ν1) \{cr}. R3( c2, ν2) holds since it already holds by hypothesis. R4(c ′1, ν′1, c 2, ν2) holds since low threads are not
affected by the transition α1. By taking p
′ = p, we have that R5(c ′1,w′1, ν′1, c2,w2, ν2, p′) holds since R5(c 1,w1,
ν1, c2,w2, ν2, p) holds and because the eventually low thread, if it exists, has made no progress. R6( c1′, ν′1)
holds since R6( c1, ν1) holds and low threads have made no progress. R7(c ′1, ν′1, c2, ν2) holds since R7(c 1, ν1,
c2, ν2) holds and H(c ′1, ν′1) = H(c 1, ν1) \ {cr}. Proposition R8( c1′, ν′1, c2, ν2) holds since R8( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds






holds since R9(σ1, ν1, σ2, ν2) holds and by applying the deﬁnition of ∼L . By inspecting the semantics of
threadpools, we have that N(w′
1
) = N(w1) ∪ {cr}. By rewriting N(w) according to R10(w1, ν1), we know that
N(w′
1
) = BL(w1, ν1) ∪ BH(w1, ν1) ∪ BEL(w1, ν1) ∪ {cr}. Since r ∈ t•1 , we also know that BH(w′1, ν′1) = BH(w1,











) = BH(w1, ν1) ∪ {cr}. Proposition











R12(w1, ν1,w2, ν2) and R13(w1, ν1) hold and because no blocked low threads are affected by the transition α1.
By R7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2), R14(w1, ν1,w2, ν2), Lemma 4 applied to cr , and the fact that BH(w′1, ν′1) = BH(w1, ν1) ∪ {cr},










,w2, ν2) and R16(w
′
1
,w2) hold since R15(w1, ν1,
w2, ν2) and R16(w1,w2) hold and because no low semaphores or the eventually low thread, if exists one, are
affected by the transition α1. By inspecting the semantics, cr ∈ H( c1, ν1), and R7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2), we have that
	(sem) = high and r ∈ t•1 . By these last facts and R17(w1, ν1), we obtain that R17(w′1, ν′1) holds. R17(w2, ν2)
holds since it already holds by hypothesis.
(cr ∈ EL( c1, ν1)) Propositions R1−4 can be proved in a similar way as when cr ∈ H( c1, ν1). By hypothesis, we know
that BEL(w1, ν1), EL( c1, ν1) ∼el,p,te1 EL( c2, ν2), BEL(w2, ν2). By inspecting the semantics, we also know that te1 =
{cr}. By inspectingDeﬁnition9,wehave that∅, {cr}∼el,p,te1 EL( c2, ν2),BEL(w2, ν2).Weneed todocaseanalysis to
determine if EL( c2, ν2) = ∅orBEL(w2, ν2) = ∅. Both cases proceed in a similarway and thereforeweomitwhen
BEL(w2, ν2) = ∅. Consequently, we have that ∅, {cr} ∼el,p,te1 ∅, {dr}where there exist commands c
′ and d′ with-
out unhide instructions such that cr ∈ {c′; unhide, unhide} and dr ∈ {d′; unhide, unhide} or cr ∈ {c′; unhide; p,
unhide; p} and dr ∈ {d′; unhide; p, unhide; p}. Since the triggered event is brsem, we can deduce that cr ∈
{c′; unhide} or cr ∈ {c′; unhide; p}. By inspecting the threadpool semantics, we have that 〈|cr ,m1|〉
b(sem)
⇀ 〈|c′r ,m′1|〉,





|〉. Let us take p′ = p. Since t′w1 = tw1 ∪ {r} and te1 = {r}, we have that BEL(w′1, ν′1) = {c′r},






, c2, ν2,w2, p′) holds. Propositions
R6( c1′, ν′1) andR7( c1′, ν′1, c2, ν2)hold sinceR6( c1, ν1) andR7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2)hold andbecause lowandhigh threads
have made no progress. Proposition R8( c1′, ν′1, c2, ν2) holds since R8( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and EL( c1′, ν′1) = ∅.
Propositions R9−13 are proved similarly as when cr ∈ H( c1, ν1). Proposition R14(w′1, ν′1,w2, ν2) holds since
R14(w1, ν1,w2, ν2)holds andbecausehigh threadshavemadenoprogress. ByR8( c1, ν1, c2, ν2), applyingLemma









R16(w1,w2) holds and because no low semaphores or the eventually low thread, if it exists, are affected by
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the transition. By inspecting the semantics, cr ∈ EL( c1, ν1), and R7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2), we have that 	(sem) = high
and r ∈ te1 . By these last facts and R17(w1, ν1), we obtain that R17(w′1, ν′1) holds. Proposition R17(w2, ν2) holds
since it already holds by hypothesis.
(α1 = brsem×) The proof proceeds similarly as when α1 = brsem.
(α1 = ursem) By inspecting the semantics of threadpools, this event can be produced by two rules in Fig. 12. Which rule is
applied depends on the existence of threads on the waiting list w1(sem) when executing signal, which is captured
by the scheduler events urr and u
r
a. The proof proceeds similarly in both cases. Therefore, we omit the case when the
scheduler triggers the event urr .
(cr ∈ H( c1, ν1)) R1(m′1,m2) holds by inspecting the semantics of threadpools and applying Lemma 3 to cr . By
semantics, the thread ca has been awakened and place into the threadpool. Since R17(w1, ν1) holds and
	(sem) = high by R7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2), we have that a ∈ t•1 ∪ te1 and consequently R2(c ′1, ν′1) holds. Proposition
R2( c2, ν2) holds since it holds by hypothesis. Proposition R3(c ′1, ν′1) holds by R3( c1, ν1) and R11(w1, ν1). Propo-
sition R3( c2, ν2) holds since it holds already by hypothesis. Propositions R4−6 can be proved in a similar way
as when α1 = brsem. To prove proposition R7( c1′, ν′1, c2, ν2), we need to consider if a ∈ t•1 . If that is the case, it is
proved by R7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) and R14(w1, ν1,w2, ν2). Otherwise, it holds since it already holds by hypothesis.
To prove proposition R8( c1′, ν′1, c2, ν2), we need to consider if a ∈ te1 . If that is the case, it is proved by
R8( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) and R15(w1, ν1,w2, ν2). Otherwise, it holds since it already holds by hypothesis. By inspecting
the semantics, we know that N(w′
1

















since R11(w1, ν1) holds and ca has beenmove from one subpool of threads to another. Proposition R12(w2, ν2)





)holds sinceR13(w1, ν1)holds andno threads










,w2, ν2) hold since









) by the transition α1. Since R17(w1, ν1) holds and 	(sem) = high by R7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2),
it holds that w′
1
=L w1 and thus R16(w′1,w2) holds. Proposition R17(w′1, ν′1) holds since R17(w1, ν1) holds and
ca has been removed from the waiting list of sem. Proposition R17(w2, ν2) holds since it already holds by
hypothesis.
(cr ∈ EL( c1, ν1)) The proof of R1−4 proceeds as when cr ∈ H( c1, ν1). Proposition R5 is proved as when α1 = brsem
and cr ∈ EL( c1, ν1). The rest of the propositions are proved similarly as when cr ∈ H( c1, ν1).
(α1 = ursem×) The proof proceeds similarly as when α1 = ursem.
(ii) In this case, all the propositions are valid since they are valid already by hypothesis. Observe that no step in the
semantics is performed.
(iii) Low events related to synchronization: brsem, b
r
sem×, ursem, and ursem× (where r ∈ L( c1, ν1) and re ∈ EL( c1, ν1)).
(α1 = brsem) By inspecting the semantics for threadpools, the scheduler, and commands, we have that cr ∈ L( c1, ν1), and
that cr = wait(sem); c′ for some command c′. By inspecting the semantics for threadpools and commands, we have
the transition 〈|cr ,m1|〉
b(sem)






|〉. Because 〈|σ1, ν1|〉 ∼L 〈|σ2, ν2|〉 and α1 is low, we also






|〉. In addition to that, we also know that cr ∈ L( c2, ν2) since L( c2, ν2) = L( c1, ν1), and that
〈|cr ,m2|〉
b(sem)
⇀ 〈|c′r ,m2|〉. We can therefore conclude that 〈| c2,m2, σ2, ν2,w2|〉
brsem→ 〈| c2′,m′2, σ ′2, ν′2,w′2|〉. R1(m′1,m′2) holds by
applying Lemma6 to cr . PropositionsR2( c1′, ν′1),R2( c2′, ν′2),R3( c1′, ν′1), andR3( c2′, ν′2)hold since propositionsR2( c1, ν1),
R2( c2, ν2), R3( c1, ν1), R3( c2, ν2), R10(w1, ν1) and R10(w2, ν2) hold and since L(c ′1, ν′1) = L(c1, ν1) \ {c′r} by inspecting the
semantics for threadpools. Proposition R4( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2) holds since R4( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and because the transition
α1 block the same low thread on both conﬁgurations. By taking p
′ = p, we have that R5( c1′,w′1, ν′1, c2′,w′2, ν′2, p)
holds since proposition R5( c1,w1, ν1, c2, ν2,w2, p) holds and because the eventually low thread, if exists one, has
made no progress. R6( c1′, ν′1) holds by R6( c1, ν1) and the fact that c′r /∈ L( c1′, ν′1). R7( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2) holds because
R7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and because high threads have been not modiﬁed by the transition α1. R8( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2) holds
because R8( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and because the eventually low threads in both conﬁgurations, if they exists, have been









) holds since R9(σ1, ν1, σ2, ν2) holds and by applying





) = N(w1) ∪ {c′r}, N( c1′) = N( c2′) = N( c1) \ {cr}, and BL(w′1, ν′1) = BL(w′2, ν′2) = BL(w1, ν2) ∪ {c′r}. By






















































) holds since R14(w1, ν1, w2, ν2) and R15(w1, ν1,w2, ν2) holds
and because transition α1 does not affect high and eventually low threads, if they exists. Since cr = wait(sem); c′,
cr ∈ L( c1, ν1), R6( c1, ν1), and typing rules, we have that 	(sem) = low. By this fact and R16(w1,w2), By inspecting the
semantics, cr ∈ L( c1, ν1), and R6( c1, ν1), we have that 	(sem) = low, r ∈ t◦1 = t◦2 . By these last facts, R17(w1, ν1), and
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(α1 = brsem×) It proceeds in a similar way as when α1 = brsem.
(α1 = ursem) By inspecting the semantics of threadpools, this event can be produced by two rules in Figure 12.Which rule
is applied depends on the waiting list w(sem) when executing signal, which is captured by the scheduler events
urr and u
r
a. The proof proceeds similarly in both cases. Therefore, we omit the case when the scheduler triggers the
event urr . By inspecting the semantics for threadpools, the scheduler, and commands, we have that cr ∈ L( c1, ν1), and
that cr = signal(sem); c′ for some command c′. By inspecting the semantics for threadpools and commands, we have
the transition 〈|cr ,m1|〉
u(sem)






|〉 for some a. Because 〈|σ1, ν1|〉 ∼L 〈|σ2, ν2|〉 and α1 is low,






|〉. In addition to that, we also know that cr ∈ L( c2, ν2) since L( c2, ν2) = L( c1, ν1),
and that 〈|cr ,m2|〉
u(sem)
⇀ 〈|c′r ,m2|〉. We can therefore conclude that 〈| c2,m2, σ2, ν2,w2|〉






) holds by applying Lemma 6 to cr . By R4( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) and inspecting the semantics of threadpools and the
scheduler, we have that L( c1′, ν′1) = L( c2′, ν′2) = L( c1, ν1) ∪ {ca}. Therefore, we have that R4( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2) holds. More-
over, R2( c1′, ν′1), R2( c2′, ν′2), R3( c1′, ν′1), and R3( c2′, ν′2) hold since R2( c1, ν1), R2( c2, ν2), R3( c1, ν1), R3( c2, ν2), R11(w1, ν1),
R11(w2, ν2),	(sem) = lowbytypingrules, andR17(w1, ν1)hold.By takingp′ = p,wehave thatR5( c1′,w′1, ν′1, c2′,w′2, ν′2, p)
holds since proposition R5( c1,w1, ν1, c2, ν2,w2, p) holds and because the eventually low thread, if exists one, has
made no progress. Proposition R6( c1′, ν′1) holds by R6( c1, ν1), inspecting the semantics of threadpools, and R13( c1, ν1).
R7( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2) holds because R7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and because high threads have been not modiﬁed by the
transition α1. R8( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2) holds because R8( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and because the eventually low threads in both










R9(σ1, ν1, σ2, ν2)holds andby applying the deﬁnition of∼L . Since r ∈ t◦1 andR6( c1, ν1), we obtain that	(sem) = low. By




















) hold since R11(w1, ν1), R11(w2, ν2), and R12(w1, ν1, w2, ν2)
hold and since BL( c1′, ν′1) = BL( c2′, ν′2) = BL( c1, ν1) \ {ca} by inspecting the semantics of threadpools. R13(w′1, ν′1) holds



















R14(w1, ν1,w2, ν2) and R15(w1, ν1,w2, ν2) holds and because transition α1 does not affect high and eventually low





) holds since R16(w1,w2) holds and since w
′
1
(sem) = w1(sem) \ {ca} by inspecting










) hold since R17(w1, ν1) and R17(w2, ν2) hold and because
t′w1 = tw1 \ {a} and t′w2 = tw2 \ {a} by semantics of the scheduler.
(α1 = ursem×) It proceeds in a similar way as when α1 = ursem.
α1 = • re) We know that re ∈ te1 . By inspecting the semantics for threadpools, the scheduler, and commands, we have
that cre = unhide; c* or cre = unhide for some command c*, cre ∈ EL( c1, ν1), 〈|cre ,m1|〉
•
⇀ 〈|c*,m1|〉, and that
〈|σ1, ν1|〉 • re⇀ 〈|σ ′1, ν′1|〉. We are only going to consider the case when cre = unhide; c* since the proof for cre = unhide
is analogous. Therefore, we omit the proof when α1 = • re×.
Because 〈|σ1, ν1|〉 ∼L 〈|σ2, ν2|〉 and α1 is low, we also have that 〈|σ2, ν2|〉 • re⇁ 〈|σ ′2, ν′2|〉. Because R5( c1,w1, ν1, c2,w2, ν2, p)
holds, we know that c* = p and that the thread with name re ∈ L( c2, ν2) or re ∈ BL(w2, ν2). Since ii) cannot be applied,
we obtain that re ∈ L( c2, ν2). Let us call c2re the thread with name re in c2. Since R5( c1,w1, ν1, c2,w2, ν2, p) holds and it
is not possible for a thread to make progress by a high computation, we have that c2re = unhide; p. As a consequence
of that, it holds that 〈|c2re ,m2|〉
•






) holds trivially since unhide has no changed the memories. R2( c1′, ν′1), R2( c2′, ν′2), R3( c1′, ν′1), and R3( c2′, ν′2)
hold since R2( c1, ν1), R2( c2, ν2), R3( c1, ν1), and R3( c2, ν2) holds; and by inspecting the semantics for the scheduler.
R4( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2) holds since R4( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and because after the transition α1, the threads cre and c2re become








) = ∅. By R5( c1,w1, ν1,









) = ∅ since no thread is blocked by the transition α1. Then, by taking p′ = skip, it trivially
holds that R5( c1′,w′1, ν′1, c2′,w′2, ν′2, skip). R6( c1′, ν′1) holds since R5( c1,w1, ν1, c2,w2, ν2, p) and R7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2, p) holds
; and by inspecting the type derivation of cre . R7( c1′, ν′1, c2′, ν′2) holds since R7( c1, ν1, c2, ν2) holds and because high










) holds since R9(σ1, ν1, σ2, ν2) holds and by applying the deﬁnition of∼L . Propositions R10−17 hold since
they hold already by hypothesis and since transition α1 does not affect blocked threads. 
Corollary 2. If 	hc ,hc → low  c : low then c is secure.
Proof. For arbitrary σ ,m1, andm2 so thatm1 =L m2 and σ is noninterferent, assume 〈|c,m1, σ , νinit |〉 ⇓ cfg1 & 〈|c,m2, σ , νinit |〉 ⇓
cfg2. Observe that, by assuming terminating conﬁgurations, it is not possible to apply case (ii) of Theorem 2.
By inductive (in the number of transition steps of the above conﬁgurations) application of Theorem2,we propagate invariant
m1 =L m2 to the terminating conﬁgurations. 
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